2018
DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2018.1486725
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Does democracy promote capital account liberalization?

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Cited by 10 publications
(14 citation statements)
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“…The political economy literature that investigates why countries have diverged in regard to the level of capital controls can be divided into four approaches, depending on their key explanatory variable. The institutionalist approach evaluates, for instance, the impact of political regimes on capital account policies, finding a negative relationship between the levels of democracy and financial openness (Eichengreen and Leblang 2008;Milner and Mukherjee 2009;Steinberg et al 2018). This relationship is based on different mechanisms.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The political economy literature that investigates why countries have diverged in regard to the level of capital controls can be divided into four approaches, depending on their key explanatory variable. The institutionalist approach evaluates, for instance, the impact of political regimes on capital account policies, finding a negative relationship between the levels of democracy and financial openness (Eichengreen and Leblang 2008;Milner and Mukherjee 2009;Steinberg et al 2018). This relationship is based on different mechanisms.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Regarding the institutions, for instance, different authors conclude that autocratic political regimes tend to impose higher levels of capital controls due to three main reasons (Eichengreen & Leblang, 2008;Haggard & Maxfield, 1993;Milner & Mukherjee, 2009;Steinberg et al, 2018). First, the liberalization of capital outflows would concede an ability of exit to domestic private capitalists, weakening authoritarian regimes (Dailami, 2000;Hirschman, 2013).…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We explore empirically the effect of export diversification on financial openness by relying on the existing studies on the macroeconomic determinants of financial openness (e.g., Grilli and Milesi-Ferreti, 1995;Gnangnon, 2019;Joyce and Noy, 2008;Karcher and Steinberg, 2013;Quinn and Inclan, 1997;Steinberg et al, 2018;Vo and Daly, 2007) and considering control variables that would potentially influence the effect of export diversification on financial openness. Thus, control variables introduced in the baseline model are the real per capita income, denoted "GDPC", which is a proxy for countries' development level; the population size, denoted "POP", which represents the country's size, that is, the domestic market size; the inflation rate, denoted "INFL"; the level of trade openness, denoted "OPEN"; the level of human capital accumulated, denoted "HUM"; and the level of democracy, denoted "DEM", which concurrently acts as a proxy for the institutional and governance quality.…”
Section: Model Specificationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Rich and well-educated countries tend to experience a greater financial integration, and hence enjoy a greater financial openness (e.g., Edison et al 2002;Joyce and Noy, 2008;Prasad et al 2003;Steinberg et al, 2018;Vo and Daly, 2007). Olson (1982) has argued that real per capita income may affect capital account liberalization if lower income per capita results in a fall in the demand for capital protection.…”
Section: Model Specificationmentioning
confidence: 99%
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