Does ‘DAC-Ability’ Really Matter? The emergence of non-DAC Donors: Introduction to Policy Arena

Kim, Soyeun; Lightfoot, Simon

doi:10.1002/jid.1795

Cited by 75 publications

(49 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…However, this does not explain the cases of Japan, Switzerland and the US, whose level of compliance with PD targets were low even though they are considered to be traditional DAC donors. It seems then that it is the similar administrative arrangements and institutional structures of the European Union (EU) countries, rather than "DAC-ability" per se, which determines levels of compliance with DAC norms (Kim and Lightfoot, 2011;Rowlands, 2008).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As noted above, non-EU countries do not appear to conform to OECD DAC principles such as those contained in the PD and the final monitoring survey result demonstrated that countries like the UK, Sweden and Denmark show higher levels of implementation compared to non-EU countries such as the US, Japan and Korea (see OECD, 2011a). However, Korea shares much in common with other non-European countries in that its aid systems is relatively diffuse and uncoordinated in comparison to those of so-called traditional European DAC members (Kim and Lightfoot, 2011;Rowlands, 2008). On top of that, most case studies of non-compliant countries have focused on traditional donors, but we have as yet relatively little understanding of whether theories built upon the European experience are commensurate with non-European cases such as Korea.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Compliance with International Norms: Implementing OECD DAC Principles in South Korea

Lim¹

2014

Globalizations

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This study raises the question of what determines compliance with the OECD DAC framework on the basis of a case study of South Korea. This research argues that fragmented institutional structures limit the bureaucratic capacity for greater compliance. At the same time, the findings illustrate that lack of interest from dominant institutions can limit the consolidation of political will for change at the national level. This study has implications for future DAC donors in that special and peer reviews can be useful methodologies to identify current limitations for change. Finally, the study emphasises the importance of consolidated political will in terms of readiness to adopt global standards at the domestic level before commencing membership and obligatory processes.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Compliance with International Norms: Implementing OECD DAC Principles in South Korea

Lim¹

2014

Globalizations

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“…There is no denying that development assistance is no longer a domaine reservé for developed countries sitting on the OECD-DAC. The DAC official development assistance enjoyed near-exclusive dominance in the 1990s, but a handful of non-DAC countries have become consequential aid providers since the 2000s (Kim and Lightfoot 2011). China has transitioned from an aid recipient to a 'net donor' (Chin 2012) and is unquestionably in the vanguard among the non-DAC donors, although the volume of its foreign aid, falling within the scope of SouthSouth cooperation, remains opaque and relatively modest in contrast to heavyweight DAC members (Kitano 2014).…”

Section: Social Competition: Is the Aiib A Competing Initiative?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and Status-Seeking: China’s Foray into Global Economic Governance

Yang¹

2016

Chin. Polit. Sci. Rev.

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Despite the long-standing debate on the rise of China, there has been relatively little attention to the country's status concerns. This article therefore examines how China sought an enhanced international status by looking into the illustrative case of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). To this end, it employs the social identity theory (SIT) framework applied to international relations (IR), in conjunction with additional insights into institutional innovation. In the IR context, SIT posits that an aspiring state resorts predominantly to one of the three status-seeking strategies-social mobility, social competition and social creativity, i.e., emulating or competing with established powers, or attempting to achieve prestige on a new dimension. As to institutional innovation, it is introduced as a construct to understand the crystallisation of social creativity in the AIIB. By virtue of analysing primary sources and secondary literature, the research at hand finds that in the case of the AIIB China adopted largely, albeit not exclusively, the social creativity strategy to mitigate the doubt of the West and boost the legitimacy of the bank. Specifically, Beijing followed the relevant rules of the game in the institutionbuilding process and presented as a legitimate addition the quintessential statusseeking initiative-partly born out of exasperations with the existing architecture. The case study on such a noteworthy institution-building effort can shed light on the underlying rationales and wider implications of similar China-backed structures and, relatedly, the strategic thinking of the Chinese leadership to seek a greater international status.

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“…Especially with regard to divergence, an implicit assumption may be that localisation of MDGs by traditional donors (as powerful decision makers) is relatively even. This underlying assumption raises an important question of how the rest of the world is largely regarded as decision/norm takers (Kim and Lightfoot, : 713‐714; Mawdsley, :190). It has somewhat obscured non‐traditional partners' attempts or participation as decision/norm makers (Wade, ; Lee, ; Kim, ; Reilly, ).…”

Section: Conceptualising Discrepancy and Unevennessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Young and Dynamic?—The Curious Case of Korea's National Level Post‐2015 Process

Kim

Ha-Nee

2015

J of Intl Development

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This paper explores Korea's national-level post-2015 process via contextualising the political economy of Seoul's aid architecture. We examine the global-local discrepancy manifested in its uneven domestic processes where the global development ideas are localised and a uniquely Korean development experience is globalised. In doing so, the paper highlights the vertically and horizontally fragmented system and the lack of capacity, coordination and consistency at the heart of an uneven post-2015 process. An in-depth analysis of Korea's ODA architecture and Saemaul ODA demonstrates how global debates become subject to arbitrary localisation and further divergence to suit vested interests of various actors within Seoul's ODA.

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Does ‘DAC-Ability’ Really Matter? The emergence of non-DAC Donors: Introduction to Policy Arena

Cited by 75 publications

References 34 publications

Compliance with International Norms: Implementing OECD DAC Principles in South Korea

Compliance with International Norms: Implementing OECD DAC Principles in South Korea

The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and Status-Seeking: China’s Foray into Global Economic Governance

Young and Dynamic?—The Curious Case of Korea's National Level Post‐2015 Process

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