Does Corruption Affect Income Inequality and Poverty?

Gupta, Sanjeev; Davoodi, Hamid; Alonso-Terme, Rosa

doi:10.2139/ssrn.882360

Cited by 162 publications

(162 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…In Fig. 1, we present the final depiction of clustering between analyzed states 6 . Due to a large number of the examined countries, we opt for a spherical representation of the dendrogram.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The most prominent topic regarding corruption is its impact on economic growth showing a negative influence of corruption on the growth [4,5]. Another attractive domain of corruption effects is in the inequality studies, which show that corruption increases inequality [6]. The increased corruption also tends to boost public investments but these yield lower returns [7].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Worldwide clustering of the corruption perception

Paulus

Krištoufek

2015

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications

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We inspect a possible clustering structure of the corruption perception among 134 countries. Using the average linkage clustering, we uncover a well-defined hierarchy in the relationships among countries. Four main clusters are identified and they suggest that countries worldwide can be quite well separated according to their perception of corruption. Moreover, we find a strong connection between corruption levels and a stage of development inside the clusters. The ranking of countries according to their corruption perfectly copies the ranking according to the economic performance measured by the gross domestic product per capita of the member states. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first one to present an application of hierarchical and clustering methods to the specific case of corruption.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Worldwide clustering of the corruption perception

Paulus

Krištoufek

2015

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications

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“…Na academia já existe um consenso de que a corrupção exerce efeitos negativos sobre o crescimento econômico (SHLEIFER; VISHNY, 1993;MAURO, 1995;BARDHAN, 1996;GUPTA;DAVOODI;ALONSO-TERME, 2002). A exemplo disso, em países onde há maior incidência de corrupção o nível de investimento tende a ser menor, em decorrência dos elevados riscos (juros elevados) e custos de transação, os quais reduzem o crescimento econômico.…”

Section: A Corrupção Como Uma Falha De Mercadounclassified

“…Apesar de uma vasta literatura sobre a corrupção, que destaca os aspectos microeconômicos desse fenômeno (BECKER, 1968;ROSE-ACKERMAN, 1975;ACEMOGLU;VERDIER, 2000;HUNT, 2006;REINIKKA;SVENSSON, 2005;FISMAN;MIGUEL, 2007) e macroeconômicos, a partir de dados agregados de diversos países (SHLEIFER; VISHNY, 1993;MAURO, 1995;BARDHAN, 1996;VAN RIJECKEGHEM;WEDER, 2001 GUPTA;DAVOODI;ALONSO-TERME, 2002); ainda há espaço para contribuições como a do presente estudo. Este, lida com o aspecto dinâmico da corrupção, uma vez que avalia a interação e o comportamento de agentes racionais, com o instrumental da teoria dos jogos, que permite antecipar as ações das partes envolvidas.…”

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A Corrupção E Seus Efeitos No Mercado De Alimentos: O Caso Da Operação “Carne Fraca”

2021

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Este artigo tem como objetivo analisar a contribuição dos contratos de incentivos para melhorar o funcionamento do mercado brasileiro de alimentos, em um ambiente de corrupção. Para isso, foi utilizado um Modelo Principal-Agente em um jogo sequencial para formular um contrato para mitigar a corrupção nesse mercado. Tal experimento foi baseado na Operação "Carne Fraca", investigada pela Polícia Federal do Brasil. Os resultados indicam que os incentivos propostos foram capazes de alinhar os interesses do Agente e do Principal, reduzindo as chances de corrupção e melhorando o funcionamento desse mercado. No entanto, o ambiente institucional brasileiro estimula o Agente ser corrupto, pois as penas não são severas e a probabilidade de um Agente corrupto ser punido é de apenas 25%.

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“…Furthermore, street-level implementation plays a key role in equity, equality, and justice for the public at large (Brodkin, 2003), which may be significantly challenged by well-known, multiple, negative effects of corruption, including exacerbating the difference between rich and poor (Gupta et al, 2002;Uslaner, 2008), creating obstacles to governmental reforms (Hellman et al, 2003;Khator et al, 1992;Lewis & Hendrawan, 2020), and causing considerable human welfare losses in the long run (Kaufmann et al, 2005).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

When street‐level implementation meets systemic corruption

Gofen

Meza

Pérez‐Chiqués

2022

Public Admin & Development

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To better understand street-level bureaucracy in developing countries, this study focuses on street-level implementation as embedded within systemic corruption, which is well-documented in the developing world. Analysis focuses on a large city in Guanajuato, which exhibits among the highest corruption rates in Mexico. To allow for a broad perspective, the analysis applies a sequential exploratory mixedmethod research design and draws on in-depth interviews with varied stakeholders (N = 17) and a representative survey of street-level bureaucrats (SLBs) (N = 594). Findings indicate that organizational corruption (ORG-C) and street-level corruption (SL-C) are two distinct, yet related phenomena. Additionally, SLBs' perceptions about the level of corruption both among superiors and among colleagues are associated with their tolerance towards inappropriate street-level interactions with citizens. By shifting attention to street-level implementation as embedded within a corrupt environment, this study provides new theoretical and practical insights about street-level implementation in developing countries and about the unique challenges of fighting systemic corruption. Policy impact statement: Common anticorruption policies often reflect an assumption that higher-level ORG-C and SL-C are separate, isolated phenomena, thus overlooking the implications of systemic corruption environments for street-level implementation in general, and for SL-C in particular. By uncovering that the willingness for street-level divergence among SLBs is influenced by their perception of corruption established by municipal administration as well as by colleagues, this study emphasizes that fighting corruption should account for the interrelationships between corruption at different organizational levels.

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Does Corruption Affect Income Inequality and Poverty?

Cited by 162 publications

References 34 publications

Worldwide clustering of the corruption perception

Worldwide clustering of the corruption perception

A Corrupção E Seus Efeitos No Mercado De Alimentos: O Caso Da Operação “Carne Fraca”

When street‐level implementation meets systemic corruption

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