Does Corporate Governance Influence Voluntary Disclosure? Evidence from India

Saha, Rupjyoti; Kabra, Kailash Chandra

doi:10.28992/ijsam.v3i2.97

Cited by 8 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 44 publications

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“…So H2 is accepted. This confirms the argument of stakeholders theory that board independence (BDI) is an effective mechanism to enhance corporate sustainability disclosure (Amran et al, 2014;Saha & Kabra, 2019).…”

Section: Variablessupporting

confidence: 84%

Determinants of Corporate Sustainability Disclosure: The Case of the S&P/EGX ESG Index

Elafify

2021

IJSAM

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The paper investigates the influence of the corporate board and the dissemination of a separate sustainability report on the corporate sustainability disclosure (CSD) level of corporations listed on the Egyptian sustainability index from 2016–2018. This study used the score-weighting scheme assigned by the Egyptian Stock Exchange (EGX) to evaluate, list, and rank companies in terms of their CSD. Empirical results reveal that boards with higher independence and larger size generate a higher CSD score. The results also support the assumption that the issuance of a separate sustainability report boosts the CSD score. The current study provides insights for policymakers and regulators in developing countries, in general, and in Egypt, in particular, regarding the role of corporate board and issuance of a separate sustainability report in promoting CSD. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no prior study has discussed the determinants of the level of CSD for corporations listed on the sustainability index in Egypt.

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Section: Variablessupporting

confidence: 84%

Determinants of Corporate Sustainability Disclosure: The Case of the S&P/EGX ESG Index

Elafify

2021

IJSAM

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“…This way of measuring OC is adopted from Singh and Gaur (2009), Sheikh et al (2013); Saggar and Singh (2017), Kao et al (2019). The measurement of ACI is consistent with Akhtaruddin and Haron (2010), Allegrini and Greco (2013), Saha and Kabra (2019)…”

Section: Measurement Of Independent Variablesmentioning

confidence: 74%

“…The measurement of BS as a total number of directors on board is adopted from Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008), Singh and Gaur (2009); Shamil et al (2014), Nahar et al (2016); Enache and Hussainey (2020), while BI is measured as the percentage of independent non-executive directors (INDs) to total number of directors on board, which is consistent with Adams and Hossain (1998), Ho and Shun Wong (2001); Barako et al (2006), Jackling and Johl (2009); Kao et al (2019), Saha and Kabra (2019) and the definition prescribed by corporate regulations in India (Companies Act, 2013;SEBI's LODR, Regulations, 2015). RD has been measured in line with Ho and Shun Wong (2001), Gul and Leung (2004); Sheikh et al (2013), Elshandidy and Neri (2015); Jizi (2017); Alkurdi et al,(2019), while measurement of GD is parallel with Singh et al (2001), Rose (2007); Adams and Ferreira (2009).…”

Section: Measurement Of Independent Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure: evidence from India

Saha

Kabra

2021

JFRA

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Purpose This study aims to examine the influence of some prominent corporate governance (CG) mechanisms such as board size (BS), board independence (BI), role duality (RD), board’s gender diversity (GD), ownership concentration (OC), audit committee independence (ACI), nomination and remuneration committee (NRC) and risk management committee (RMC) on voluntary disclosure (VD), as well as different types of VD after controlling the effect of some firm-specific factors for Indian firms. Design/methodology/approach The study selects market capitalization-based top 100 non-financial and non-utility firms listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange as on 31st March 2014. Data are drawn from the Capitaline Plus database over the period of 2014–2018. Appropriate panel data regression model is applied to examine the influence of CG on VD. Findings The study reveals a significant negative influence of BI on VD while GD and RMC exhibit a significant positive influence on the same. The remaining CG mechanisms such as BS, RD, OC, ACI and NRC appear to have no significant influence on VD. Analysis into the relationship between CG mechanisms and different types of VD reveals that BI, in particular, has a strong negative influence on corporate strategic disclosure (CSD) and forward looking disclosure (FWLD) while GD and RMC both exhibit a significant positive influence on CSD, FWLD, CG disclosure and financial and capital market disclosure. Notably, none of the CG mechanisms under consideration influence human and intellectual capital disclosure. Research limitations/implications The study considers annual reports as the only medium of making VD and ignores all other sources such as websites and press releases. Besides, it mainly emphasizes on corporate board structure, board committees and OC while other ownership structure-related variables family ownership, managerial ownership are not covered, which can be analysed in future studies. Practical implications The study offers some important theoretical, as well as practical connotations for regulators and practitioners operating in India, as well as other emerging economies having similar institutional settings. Originality/value The study is the first of its kind in India that examines the influence of various CG mechanisms on different types of VD and thereby contributes novel findings in the context of an emerging economy.

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“…Thus, a firm with a high managerial pay disparity could reduce the risk premium and, consequently, the cost of financing firms. Research from the United States provides evidence that executive pay disparity is negatively associated with the implicit cost of equity capital [22,23].…”

Section: Executive Compensation Based On Sustainable Development and The Cost Of Equitymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Effect of Corporate Social Responsibility and the Executive Compensation on Implicit Cost of Equity: Evidence from French ESG Data

2021

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This research aimed to evaluate the effect of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and executive incentive compensation based on the achievement of sustainability goals on the implicit cost of equity. To test the study’s hypotheses, the authors applied linear regressions on panel data using the Thomson Reuters ASSET4 and Thompson Institutional Brokers Earnings Services (I/B/E/S) database of a sample of 154 French ESG firms over the 2015–2020 period. Our results show that CSR activities lower the cost of equity capital; hence, these activities are important to shareholders’ investment and financing decisions. The results have practical implications for investors and other partners interested in the business. Thus, using the implicit cost of equity is a better estimate of shareholder requirements in the context of socially responsible businesses. The results of this work could attract the attention of socially responsible investors and, especially, corporate citizens.

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Does Corporate Governance Influence Voluntary Disclosure? Evidence from India

Cited by 8 publications

References 44 publications

Determinants of Corporate Sustainability Disclosure: The Case of the S&P/EGX ESG Index

Determinants of Corporate Sustainability Disclosure: The Case of the S&P/EGX ESG Index

Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure: evidence from India

The Effect of Corporate Social Responsibility and the Executive Compensation on Implicit Cost of Equity: Evidence from French ESG Data

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