Does Consent Engender Compliance? Insights from Empirical Research on International Tribunals

Abstract

Zachary Mollengarden and Noam Zamir base their conclusion that the Monetary Gold principle should be abandoned on both legal considerations and policy implications. These two elements, however, do not receive equal attention in the article. This essay unpacks the authors’ dismissal of the idea that, by subjecting jurisdiction to consent, the principle makes compliance with awards from the ICJ more likely. Based on the notion that judicial decisions should be understood as embedded within wider political bargains, I contend that while consent might be indicative of states’ willingness to abide by a judicial decision, what ultimately matters for changing state policy towards compliance is the set of incentives that states face in the context of these wider political bargains. Thus, the essay argues, in line with Mollengarden and Zamir, that abandoning the Monetary Gold principle need not make the Court less effective. However, it will not necessarily make it more impactful either. Beyond Monetary Gold and in relation to its role in world politics more broadly, the Court's impact rests, ultimately, on how political actors––including the ICJ itself––mobilize rulings strategically.