Does CEO'S Holding of Vested Options Measure Overcon Dence?

Bayat, Ali; Salehnejad, Reza; Kawalek, Peter

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2825027

Cited by 1 publication

(1 citation statement)

References 16 publications

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“…However, according to Malmendier and Tate (2015), Execucomp data prior to 2006 cannot be used to calculate this measure, while noting that our sample period runs from 1996 to 2014. Second, a recent study by Bayat et al (2016) suggests that this option-based measure does not accurately measure hubris at the CEO level; rather, it measures firm characteristics. They find that CEOs who are considered hubristic according to the option-based measure are not considered as hubristic when they change their affiliation.…”

Section: Robustness Testsmentioning

confidence: 99%

What Drives the Declining Wealth Effect of Subsequent Share Repurchase Announcements?

Ding

Koerniadi

Krishnamurti

2020

JRFM

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Recent academic studies document that open market share repurchase announcements in the United States generate significantly lower returns than those reported in earlier studies. We find that the lower announcement return is associated with an increasing number of subsequent announcements in the more recent periods. Although the announcement period return from the initial announcement is positive, subsequent announcement returns are significantly decreasing. Further, we find that the decreasing returns of subsequent announcements are attributed to firms with negative past repurchase announcement returns. Our multivariate regression test results are consistent with the notion that the decreasing subsequent repurchase announcement returns are driven by hubris-endowed managers.

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Section: Robustness Testsmentioning

confidence: 99%