2009
DOI: 10.1016/j.jimonfin.2008.12.015
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Does bank ownership increase firm value? Evidence from China

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Cited by 62 publications
(64 citation statements)
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References 34 publications
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“…Our findings also confirm that dual holding is less likely to add value for SOEs, which is consistent with the evidence from other emerging markets (Fok et al, 2004;Lin et al, 2009), while dual holding is more likely to increase value for non-SOEs, which is similar to what occurs in developed markets. Our investigation complements the notion that dual holding can be a double-edged sword in emerging markets.…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 91%
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“…Our findings also confirm that dual holding is less likely to add value for SOEs, which is consistent with the evidence from other emerging markets (Fok et al, 2004;Lin et al, 2009), while dual holding is more likely to increase value for non-SOEs, which is similar to what occurs in developed markets. Our investigation complements the notion that dual holding can be a double-edged sword in emerging markets.…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 91%
“…Soft lending then encourages SOEs with dual holding to invest more into building their empires, regardless of whether they have good investment opportunities; this reduces their investment efficiency (Firth et al, 2008;Lin et al, 2009). In this sense we conjecture that dual holding reduces the monitoring of firm investment, which results in less efficient investment for SOEs because dual holding increases the chance of collusion between banks' and firms' managers, who tend in this situation to pursue empire building rather than maximize value.…”
Section: Hypothesis Developmentmentioning
confidence: 95%
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“…First, due to the unique institutional background (such as weak legal enforcement, overall poor corporate governance, etc. ), the monitoring role of private ownership over companies is questioned: For example, although most studies on developed markets agree that direct bank ownership provides better capital access to, and better monitoring of, companies (Diamond, 1984;Barth et al, 2006), Lin, Zhang, and Zhu (2009) document that bank ownership in China is associated with poorer operating performance, possibly due to inefficient investments.…”
Section: Ownership and Earnings Managementmentioning
confidence: 99%