Do we see facts?

Abstract

Philosophers of perception frequently assume that we see actual states of affairs, or facts. Call this claim factualism. In his book, William Fish suggests that factualism is supported by phenomenological observation as well as by experimental studies on multiple object tracking and dynamic feature-object integration. In this paper, I examine the alleged evidence for factualism, focusing mainly on object detection and tracking. I argue that there is no scientific evidence for factualism. This conclusion has implications for studies on the phenomenology and epistemology of visual perception.

How artworks modify our perception of the world

“…The aesthetic literature contains plenty of references to an aesthetic mode of perception (e.g. Levinson, 2016, p. 39;Tomas, 1959). Reflecting on the importance of attention in shaping our perceptual acquaintance with artworks, we can say that, when the subject looks aesthetically at a given target her attention structures «her mental life so that a state of seeing that thing [AED-properties, in our case] is prioritized» (Watzl, 2017, p. 45; cf.…”

The rational role of the perceptual sense of reality

“…This point is meant to capture the generic phenomenology of seeing objects. As such, it remains uncommitted with respect to a more technical question of whether the objects tracked in visual perception are best modeled as bundles of properties, or as bare particulars to which the properties are attributed, or in terms of some other ontological category altogether (for some relevant work, seeSkrzypulec, 2018;Vernazzani, 2021).…”