Abstract:Employment contracts are often incomplete, leaving many responsibilities subject to workers' discretion. High work morale is therefore essential for sustaining voluntary cooperation and high productivity in firms. We conducted a field experiment to test whether workers reciprocate wage cuts and raises with low or high work productivity. Wage cuts had a detrimental and persistent impact on productivity, reducing average output by more than 20 percent. An equivalent wage increase, however, did not result in any … Show more
“…The specifics of our design are more in line with Maximiano et al (2007) though. Like in that paper we let subjects play the gift-exchange game only once, rather than repeatedly in a row.…”
Section: Experimental Designmentioning
confidence: 87%
“…Compared to Fehr et al (1998) and Maximiano et al (2007) the payoff functions that we use here differ in two notable ways. First, the marginal returns to effort are four times higher, i.e.…”
Section: Experimental Designmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Abeler et al (2010) explore whether effort decisions of (in principle) equally productive workers are affected by equal versus unequal wages. 3 As our focus is on vertical fairness the study of Maximiano et al (2007) is more closely related to ours. In that experiment the employer has four workers and (by design) pays an equal wage to them.…”
“…The specifics of our design are more in line with Maximiano et al (2007) though. Like in that paper we let subjects play the gift-exchange game only once, rather than repeatedly in a row.…”
Section: Experimental Designmentioning
confidence: 87%
“…Compared to Fehr et al (1998) and Maximiano et al (2007) the payoff functions that we use here differ in two notable ways. First, the marginal returns to effort are four times higher, i.e.…”
Section: Experimental Designmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Abeler et al (2010) explore whether effort decisions of (in principle) equally productive workers are affected by equal versus unequal wages. 3 As our focus is on vertical fairness the study of Maximiano et al (2007) is more closely related to ours. In that experiment the employer has four workers and (by design) pays an equal wage to them.…”
“…In the field, psychologists found that a waitress with a broad smile receives greater tips (Tidd & Lockard, 1978), while economists have found that kind acts are rewarded in the context of charitable donations (Falk, 2007). Both economists and psychologists have also found negative reciprocity, for example, in the context of wage cuts (Greenberg, 1990;Kube, Marechal & Puppe, 2010). Several theoretical models complement these investigations (e.g., Cox et al, 2007;Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger, 2004;Falk & Fischbacher, 2006).…”
Reciprocity is common in economic and social domains, and it has been widely documented in the laboratory. While positive and negative reciprocity are observed in investment and ultimatum games, respectively, prior laboratory studies often neglect the effect of time delays that are common in real-world interactions. This research investigates the effect of time delays on reciprocity in the investment and ultimatum games. We manipulate the time delay after second movers have been informed about the first movers' decisions. We find that a delay is correlated with fewer rejections in the ultimatum game, but we find no effect of delays in the investment game. A follow-up study explores some of the processes that occur during time delay in the ultimatum game. We find delays correlated to increased reported feelings of satisfaction and decreased reported feelings of disappointment. Increased satisfaction is correlated to an increased probability of rejection, while disappointment has a more complex relationship to the probability of rejection.
“…Recent studies …nd mostly moderate support for positive reciprocity. See for instance Gneezy and List (2006), Cohn et al (2009), Kube et al (2010), Bellemare and Shearer (2009) and Hennig-Schmidt et al (2010). 4 See for instance "Performance Reviews: Many Need Improvement" in the New York Times (September 10, 2006).…”
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D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SIZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author.IZA Discussion Paper No. 5020 June 2010
ABSTRACT Performance Appraisals and the Impact of Forced Distribution: An Experimental InvestigationA real effort experiment is investigated in which supervisors have to rate the performance of individual workers who in turn receive a bonus payment based on these ratings. We compare a baseline treatment in which supervisors were not restricted in their rating behavior to a forced distribution system in which they had to assign differentiated grades. We find that productivity was significantly higher under a forced distribution by about 8%. But also in the absence of forced distribution, deliberate differentiation positively affected output in subsequent work periods.JEL Classification: C91, D83, J33, M52
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