This article examines whether an insurer could gain advantageous information on repeat customers over its rivals in the Singapore automobile insurance market, which is featured by partial information sharing among insurers. We find that the insurer does update and accumulate more information regarding its policyholders' riskiness through repeated observations and thus make higher profits with repeat customers especially those of lower risk. We also show that the higher profit is driven by the fact that low risks tend to stay longer with the insurer, and in the meanwhile, they are charged a premium higher than their actuarial risk level.
IntroductionIn economics and contract theory, information asymmetry refers to the situation where one party possesses information that is not available to another party in a transaction. Asymmetric learning, a particular form of information asymmetry, arises when a "seller" could gain advantageous information on its repeat "buyers" over its rivals through repeated contracting. Asymmetric learning could result in market power, and thus lead to higher profits from repeat customers (see Kunreuther and Pauly, 1985).