Do Targeted Assassinations Work? A Multivariate Analysis of Israel's Controversial Tactic during Al-Aqsa Uprising¹

Abstract

We assess the impact of Israel's targeted assassinations policy on rates of Palestinian violence from September 2000, the beginning of Al-Aqsa uprising, through June 2004. Literature concerning the relationship between repression and rebellion suggests four plausible effects of targeted assassinations on insurgents: deterrence, backlash, disruption, and incapacitation. Using differenced and lagged time-series analysis, this article utilizes multiple and logistic regression to evaluate the effect of targeted assassinations on Palestinian violence. It is concluded that targeted assassinations have no significant impact on rates of Palestinian attacks. Targeted assassinations do not decrease rates of Palestinian violence, nor do they increase them, whether in the short or long run. Targeted assassinations may be useful as a political tool to signal a state's determination to punish terrorists and placate an angry public, but there is little evidence that they actually impact the course of an insurgency.

Targeted Killings in Afghanistan: Measuring Coercion and Deterrence in Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency

“…Those that have evaluated targeted killings focus almost exclusively on the Israeli Downloaded by [New York University] case study and the Al-Aqsa Intifada (2000)(2001)(2002)(2003)(2004)(2005). 11 Both trends suggest that a broader research agenda is long overdue. Second, the literature on targeted killings suggests that their use diminishes an organization's motivation to carry on coordinating campaigns of violence.…”

Moving Beyond Deterrence

“…The appeal of interrupted time-series analysis is that it allows researchers to evaluate the effectiveness of specific types of interventions or policies, such as stricter laws or police crackdowns, on the particular behaviors these policies are trying to affect (Goldkamp and Vilcica 2008;Ross 1982;Sherman 1990). Efforts to reduce terrorist behavior include terrorist apprehension and extended prison sentencing (Landes 1978), passage of anti-terrorism laws (Enders and Sandler 1993), assassination (Byman 2006;Hafez and Hatfield 2006;Jaeger and Paserman 2008;Maoz 2007;Plaw 2008;Zussman and Zussman 2006), curfews and containment strategies Maoz 2007), deportation (Maoz 2007), home demolitions (Benmelech, Berrebi, and Klor 2010), violent repression and military retaliation (Brophy-Baermann and Conybeare 1994;Brym and Araj 2006;Enders and Sandler 1993;Maoz 2007;Testas 2004), and indiscriminate repression (Lyall 2009). Some scholars have also examined effects of containment policies, such as installation of metal detectors (Cauley and Im 1988;Dugan et al 2005;Enders and Sandler 1993;Landes 1978).…”

Counterterrorism Killings and Provisional IRA Bombings, 1970–1998

“…Larger brigades, in terms of membership, seem to have launched fewer overall IED events (models 2, 4, 6, 7) and fewer bombings against noncivilian targets (models [12][13][14]. This may be a result of PIRA's compartmentalization of roles and functions within these brigades.…”

“…4 Critics charge that assassination of terrorists, in addition to violating basic democratic and human rights, may actually prompt more terrorist activity, erode public support for state counterterrorism officials, enhance sympathy for terrorists and provide the targeted terrorist movements with propaganda fodder. 5 Still others argue for the use of more discriminate and limited assassination of terrorists, in which confirmed terrorists are targeted with minimal civilian or collateral damage, to degrade terrorist group capacity while minimizing the public relations "costs" of such policies. 6 During the Northern Ireland conflict (1970-1998) British military and police forces engaged in both discriminate and indiscriminate lethal violence -via an unspoken policy popularly titled "Shoot to Kill" -against Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) members, and members of the wider Catholic community from which the PIRA drew support.…”