2004
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.633283
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Do Short Sellers Target Firms with Poor Earnings Quality? Evidence from Earnings Restatements

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Cited by 84 publications
(140 citation statements)
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References 21 publications
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“…In particular, we discuss front running, short selling, insider trading and price pressure. Other studies suggest short sellers anticipate adverse news in earnings announcements (Christophe, Ferri and Angel, 2004) and earnings restatements (Desai, Krishnamurthy and Venkataraman, 2006), consistent with short sellers being informed.…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 83%
“…In particular, we discuss front running, short selling, insider trading and price pressure. Other studies suggest short sellers anticipate adverse news in earnings announcements (Christophe, Ferri and Angel, 2004) and earnings restatements (Desai, Krishnamurthy and Venkataraman, 2006), consistent with short sellers being informed.…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 83%
“…Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) show theoretically that a market with short-sale constraints incorporates information more slowly than a market in which short sales are not restricted. Empirical evidence that short sellers contribute to market efficiency and market quality can be found in, among others, Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek, and Sloan (2001), Desai, Krishnamurthy, and Kumar (2006), Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu (2007), Chang, Cheng, and Yu (2007), Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2008), Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011), and Boehmer and Wu (2013). Short positions are important hedging tools in a number of common trading strategies (e.g., hedging options, convertible bonds, or market risk in long-short strategies).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Beneish (1999) fi nds that the managers of restating fi rms are more likely to sell equity holdings and exercise stock appreciation rights. Desai, Krishnamurthy, and Venkataraman (2006) fi nd that restatements are preceded by a run-up in short selling, and this short selling is more intense when accounting accruals appear to be infl ated, suggesting that some market participants are able to anticipate the market's response to what they see is suspect fi nancial reporting. Core (2001) notes that it is diffi cult to infer causation from empirical studies of restatements because the structure of managerial compensation, corporate governance, and fi nancial structure are determined jointly with misreporting.…”
Section: Empirical Studies Of Misreportingmentioning
confidence: 99%