Do Restrictive Rules Produce Nonmedian Outcomes? A Theory with Evidence from the 101st−108th Congresses

Abstract

A fundamental tenet of partisan theories of legislative organization is that the majority party is able to generate outcomes that deviate in their preferred direction from the chamber median. While these biased outcomes may be achieved through arm twisting on final passage votes, there is a more efficient means for achieving this bias: restrictive rules. While scholars have recognized this tactic as an important leadership tool in the House, its effectiveness has been often assumed but never empirically tested. We develop a theoretical model that demonstrates how the majority party can use restrictive rules to offer successful ''take-it-or-leave-it'' proposals to the floor median. More significantly, we test this model using DW-NOMINATE's estimated cut points of final passage roll calls in the House from the 101 st to 108 th Congress. Our results support the prediction of our model and suggest that majority party leaders achieve biased policy outcomes through the use of restrictive rules. Mr. Speaker, this is a sad day for the United States House of Representatives. This rule, quite frankly, is an insult to every single Member of this body. This rule should be open, and instead this rule is typically restrictive. This rule should be defeated. The underlying bill, contrary to what you have heard here today, is not a reflection of bipartisan deliberation, because the truth is that deliberation is all but dead in this House. .. I would say to my colleagues on the other side of the aisle, if you want to show some bipartisanship, if you want to promote a process that has some integrity, this should be an open rule.-Rep. James P. McGovern (D-Massachusetts) Congressional Record, H1877,

The Cost of Majority‐Party Bias: Amending Activity under Structured Rules

“…In exchange for supporting the less visible vote on the special rule, majority‐party moderates are paid off with side payments (Krehbiel, Meirowitz, and Wiseman ; Snyder ). These include favorable office assignments (Cox and McCubbins , ), disproportionately high compensation to congressional campaigns (Jenkins and Monroe , ), and collective benefits accrued through the maintenance of a favorable partisan “brand name” (Cox and McCubbins ; Monroe and Robinson ) . As Monroe and Robinson note: “Instead of requiring majority party members to make difficult choices on highly visible substantive final passage votes, restrictive rules allow for less costly acts of loyalty by voting with the party on much less visible (and less widely understood) ‘procedural’ votes” (2008, 218).…”

“…While theoretically appealing, Monroe and Robinson () and Jenkins and Monroe () note that these electoral side payments are likely only part of the story. We argue that another likely means of compensation is through the construction of the special rule itself.…”

“…By issuing restrictive or closed rules, the majority‐party‐controlled Rules Committee can potentially shut the minority party out of the amending process (Aldrich and Rohde ; Cox and McCubbins ). Moreover, scholars have argued that majority‐party centrists—members spatially located on the minority‐party side of the majority‐party median in a unidimensional policy space—can incur policy loss under this arrangement as well (Cox and McCubbins ; Jenkins and Monroe , ; Monroe and Robinson ; Young and Wilkins ). By extension, this can lead to substantial policy loss for their supporters in the electorate, harming the interests of moderate and potential median voters in the US electorate.…”

Parties and Procedural Choice in the House Rules Committee

“…The Rules Committee acts in this manner to facilitate noncentrist outcomes that the majority party, substantive committee, and Rules Committee all prefer to the floor median's preferred policies (Dion and Huber 1996;Monroe and Robinson 2008). Moreover, the Rules Committee produces a higher percentage of restrictive rules in such a situation because the majority party wants to retain its influence over legislative outcomes (c.f., Rohde 1991).…”

Institutional Context and Party Power: Member Participation and Leadership Strategy in the Lame-Duck Congressional Era

“…8 To determine whether parties pursue more extreme or moderate agendas, we need to specify the model to account for potential shifts, recognizing that the direction of those shifts likely varies by party. We take advantage of an estimation strategy utilized by Monroe and Robinson (2008). 9 Because we are interested in session-based effects, we include a dummy variable coded 1 for lame-duck sessions, 0 otherwise.…”