Do religious identity and media messages join forces? Young Dutch Muslims’ identification management strategies in the Netherlands

Abstract

This study investigates, using an experimental study, the consequences of negative and positive media messages on young Muslims by gaining insight into who, and under which circumstances, engages in certain collective or individual identity-management strategies. Based on Social Identity Theory (SIT) and previous literature, we expect that negative and more positive media messages moderate the relationship between the degree of identification with the religious group and the application of identity-management strategies. Factor analyses illustrate the presence of at least three types of strategies: collective-fight strategies (meaning one is willing to fight for the group), collective flight-strategies (that entail no change of the status quo) and individual strategies (strategies that solely benefit the individual). Contributions are made empirically and theoretically. Empirically, we measure and group all proposed identity-management strategies based on our findings among the same research population. Theoretically, we hypothesise about how both negative and positive media messages condition the role of religious saliency for Muslims’ identity-management strategies. Results from a survey-embedded experiment among Dutch Moroccan and Turkish Muslims show that high identifiers are more likely to apply fight strategies, and less likely to apply individual strategies (in line with SIT). Regardless of tone, exposure to messages mentioning Muslims make the application of fight strategies more likely among high identifiers. Meanwhile lower identifiers feel a reduced need for change when exposed to more positive messages. These insights in the (mutual) role of religious identification and media messages shed new light on how media messages can bring about group distances, intergroup conflicts and intragroup cohesion and provide a stepping-stone for future research to further insight in the systemic and long-term implications thereof.

The impact of anti-Muslim hostilities on how Muslims connect their religiosity to support for gender equality in Western Europe

“…The reason is that the imagined values of a community are changeable, but orthodox prescriptions are, by definition, unchangeable. Social identity scholars have argued that this changeability of group positions is pivotal to understanding how communities react to hostilities (Tajfel and Turner, 1979;Branscombe et al, 1999;Verkuyten and Reijerse, 2008; see also Geurts and Van Klingeren, 2021;Dickey et al, 2022). If group positions are changeable, groups can change them when faced with hostile attacks.…”

“…When social identities are met with hostility, SIT predicts that people employ coping strategies, one of which entails revaluing the traits deemed negative by the dominant native majority as positive, thereby creating a positive social identity in the face of rejection (Tajfel and Turner, 1979;Branscombe et al, 1999) . As hostile European societies portray Muslims as foreign "others" based in part on their supposed lack of support for "the core Western value" of gender equality and their religion (Roggeband and Verloo, 2007;Yilmaz, 2015;Geurts and Van Klingeren, 2021), Muslims who frequent mosques and strongly identified Muslims are thus expected to re-assert the value of gender traditionalism in particular in hostile contexts (Phalet et al, 2013;Glas, 2021Glas, , 2022aRöder and Spierings, 2022). Especially qualitative studies have shown how Muslims do just that, for instance arguing against the worth of sexual liberalization by slut-shaming non-migrant women who "sleep around" "as if they have no values" (Le Espiritu, 2001); see also (Ajrouch, 2004;Giuliani et al, 2017;Glas, 2021).…”

“…If so, we suggest this might indicate that when Western European Muslims encounter hostile environments that question the gender attitudes of their communities, they do not respond by re-appropriating the value of gender traditionalism. Rather, they might re-imagine their community values in a more liberal direction, as we shall return to in the conclusion (Verkuyten and Reijerse, 2008;Geurts and Van Klingeren, 2021;Dickey et al, 2022).…”

The Social Construct of Religious Identity and Its Implications on the Integration Experience of Immigrant Muslim Youth in Canada

“…Furthermore, at an individual level young Muslim may begin to explore ways to belong within the Canadian society. This is done through distancing themselves from their religion to fit into a group, seeking out educational and work experiences that assist with upward mobility in an effort to be accepted as a "Canadian" (Baysu et al, 2016;Geurts & Klingeren, 2021;Khan & Khanlou, 2019). For young Muslims making these efforts to gain a sense of acceptance and belonging is vital and those young people with a stronger connection to religious identity are more likely to face discrimination than those that closely resemble the Canadian lifestyle (Abo-Zena & Barry, 2013;Amini & Nguyan, 2021;;Phalet et al, 2018).…”

Religiosity and electoral turnout among Muslims in Western Europe

“…SIT posits that people strive for a positive group identity. Identifying with a marginalized groupsuch as European Muslims, is said to motivate group members to act on behalf of their group to better their group position (Taifel, 1982;de Koning, 2013;Simon and Klandermans, 2001;Geurts and van Klingeren, 2021). If we connect this to the civic duty literature that stresses that voting is considered an esteemed behavior in Western democracies, we could expect that higher identifying Muslims may vote as an act to improve their group distinction.…”