Do Minority Cabinets Govern More Flexibly and Inclusively? Evidence from Germany

Abstract

A widespread view in political science is that minority cabinets govern more flexibly and inclusively, more in line with a median-oriented and 'consensual' vision of democracy. Yet there is only little empirical evidence for it. We study legislative coalition-building in the German state of North-Rhine-Westphalia, which was ruled by a minority government between 2010 and 2012. We compare the inclusiveness of legislative coalitions under minority and majority cabinets, based on 1028 laws passed in the 1985-2017 period, and analyze in detail the flexibility of legislative coalition formation under the minority government. Both quantitative analyses are complemented with brief case studies of specific legislation. We find, first, that the minority cabinet did not rule more inclusively. Second, the minority cabinet's legislative flexibility was fairly limited; to the extent that it existed, it follows a pattern that cannot be explained on the basis of the standard spatial model with policy-seeking parties.

Introduction

“…Among the most notable experiments are the first CDU-Green coalition (Hamburg 2008), the first coalitions with a Green prime minister (Green-SPD in Baden-Württemberg 2011, Green-CDU in Baden-Württemberg 2016), and an increasing number of three-party coalitions, such as Die Linke-SPD-Green (Thuringia 2014), CDU-SPD-Green (Saxony-Anhalt 2016), and CDU-SPD-FDP (Saxony-Anhalt 2021). By contrast, German parties have proven much more reluctant to form minority coalitions, of which Germany has only seen four since reunification, two in Saxony-Anhalt in the 1990s, 35 and more recently in North Rhine-Westphalia (2012) 36 and in Thuringia (2019).…”

The Frequency of Use of Legislative and Non-Legislative Tools in Five Countries

“…As government party members they can cooperate with other government party members or with opposition party members. Indeed, when the issue of the proposed bill is controversial, we expect the government-opposition conflict to be at its highest (Ganghof et al 2019). However, when the issues are not controversial and pertain mainly to issues marginal to the general electorate, opposition members will vote in favor of bills initiated by government party members (Tuttnauer 2020).…”

Designing Democratic Constitutions: The Search for Optimality

“…In contrast, when parties enter fixed coalitions, either portfolio coalitions or support agreements, they tend to establish each other as "veto players," so that legislation requires unanimity within the coalition (Tsebelis, 2002). Empirical evidence suggests that when minority cabinets form, it is more likely that opposition parties can represent their voters not only in parliamentary debate but also in actual policy-making (e.g., Angelova, Bäck, Müller, & Strobl, 2018;Ganghof, Eppner, Stecker, Heeß, & Schukraft, 2019;Klüver & Zubek, 2018). The problem is that institutional efforts to stabilize cabinets in fragmented parliaments may discourage the formation of minority cabinets, especially single-party minority cabinets that seek issuespecific support.…”