Do memory-impaired individuals report stable attitudes?

Haddock, Geoffrey; Newson, Margaret; Haworth, Judy

doi:10.1348/014466610x512752

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 27 publications

(47 reference statements)

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“…First, despite initial belief that semantic memory lacked a self‐referential component,130,131 it now is well known that semantic memory stores information about one's self (Refs 132–137; for review see Refs 138,139). Self‐referential semantic memory includes, but is not limited to, facts about one's life (e.g., name, occupation, favorite foods; Refs 135,139,140), personal goals,69 personal attitudes,141 a sense of personal diachronicity141–144 and knowledge of one's personality 145 . g…”

Section: Types Of Selves: a Case For Multiplicity And For The Possibimentioning

confidence: 99%

The complex act of projecting oneself into the future

Klein

2012

WIRES Cognitive Science

122

152

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Research on future-oriented mental time travel (FMTT) is highly active yet somewhat unruly. I believe this is due, in large part, to the complexity of both the tasks used to test FMTT and the concepts involved. Extraordinary care is a necessity when grappling with such complex and perplexing metaphysical constructs as self and time and their co-instantiation in memory. In this review, I first discuss the relation between future mental time travel and types of memory (episodic and semantic). I then examine the nature of both the types of self-knowledge assumed to be projected into the future and the types of temporalities that constitute projective temporal experience. Finally, I argue that a person lacking episodic memory should nonetheless be able to imagine a personal future by virtue of (1) the fact that semantic, as well as episodic, memory can be self-referential, (2) autonoetic awareness is not a prerequisite for FMTT, and (3) semantic memory does, in fact, enable certain forms of personally oriented FMTT.

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Section: Types Of Selves: a Case For Multiplicity And For The Possibimentioning

confidence: 99%

The complex act of projecting oneself into the future

Klein

2012

WIRES Cognitive Science

122

152

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“…Accordingly, semantic selfknowledge might be a system that offers the continuity of memory required for diachronicity in the face of episodic impairment. A number of psychological investigators recently have drawn this conclusion-that is, a sense of personal identity may be maintained by semantic self-knowledge in the absence of partial (i.e., "gapy": for discussion, see Slors 2001) episodic recollection (e.g., Duval et al 2012;Haddock et al 2010;Haslam et al 2010;Illman et al 2011;Klein and Lax 2010;Rathbone et al 2009. ) However, even finer resolution comes from the finding that individuals suffering loss of both episodic and factual semantic knowledge maintain a coherent and extended sense of self (although they cannot episodically or factually support their sense when explicitly requested to do so; e.g., Klein 2012).…”

Section: Memory and The Sense Of Personal Identitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In this paper, I focus on the memorial bases of diachronic personal identity. In psychological (e.g., Duval et al 2012;Haddock et al 2010;Haslam et al 2010;Klein 2012;Klein and Lax 2010;Rathbone et al 2009;Sani 2008) and philosophical (e.g., Brennan 1985;Butler 1736Butler /1819Dainton 2008;Klein and Nichols 2012;Lund 2005;Reid 1785;Schechtman 1996;Shoemaker and Swinburne 1984;Olson 2007) discussions, long-term memory often is seen as playing the critical evidential role in knowledge of numerical personal identity. However, the nature of the implicated long-term memory system(s) has been vague.…”

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confidence: 99%

The sense of diachronic personal identity

Klein¹

2012

Phenom Cogn Sci

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In this paper, I first consider a famous objection that the standard interpretation of the Lockean account of diachronicity (i.e., one's sense of personal identity over time) via psychological connectedness falls prey to breaks in one's personal narrative. I argue that recent case studies show that while this critique may hold with regard to some long-term autobiographical self-knowledge (e.g., episodic memory), it carries less warrant with respect to accounts based on trait-relevant, semantic selfknowledge. The second issue I address concerns the question of diachronicity from the vantage point that there are (at least) two aspects of self-the self of psychophysical instantiation (what I term the epistemological self) and the self of first person subjectivity (what I term the ontological self; for discussion, see Klein SB, The self and its brain, Social Cognition, 30, 474-518, 2012). Each is held to be a necessary component of selfhood, and, in interaction, they are appear jointly sufficient for a synchronic sense of self (Klein SB, The self and its brain, Social Cognition, 30, 474-518, 2012). As pertains to diachronicity, by contrast, I contend that while the epistemological self, by itself, is precariously situated to do the work required by a coherent theory of personal identity across time, the ontological self may be better positioned to take up the challenge.

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Internally Displaced “Victims of Armed Conflict” in Colombia: The Trajectory and Trauma Signature of Forced Migration

Shultz

Garfin

Espinel

et al. 2014

Curr Psychiatry Rep

111

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While conflict-induced forced migration is a global phenomenon, the situation in Colombia, South America, is distinctive. Colombia has ranked either first or second in the number of internally displaced persons for 10 years, a consequence of decades of armed conflict compounded by high prevalence of drug trafficking. The displacement trajectory for displaced persons in Colombia proceeds through a sequence of stages: (1) pre-expulsion threats and vulnerability, (2) expulsion, (3) migration, (4) initial adaptation to relocation, (5) protracted resettlement (the end point for most forced migrants), and, rarely, (6) return to the community of origin. Trauma signature analysis, an evidence-based method that elucidates the physical and psychological consequences associated with exposures to harm and loss during disasters and complex emergencies, was used to identify the psychological risk factors and potentially traumatic events experienced by conflict-displaced persons in Colombia, stratified across the phases of displacement. Trauma and loss are experienced differentially throughout the pathway of displacement.

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Do memory-impaired individuals report stable attitudes?

Cited by 5 publications

References 27 publications

The complex act of projecting oneself into the future

The complex act of projecting oneself into the future

The sense of diachronic personal identity

Internally Displaced “Victims of Armed Conflict” in Colombia: The Trajectory and Trauma Signature of Forced Migration

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