2019
DOI: 10.1007/s11142-019-09496-x
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Do managers withhold bad news from credit rating agencies?

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1
1
1

Citation Types

2
10
0
2

Year Published

2020
2020
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
7
1

Relationship

0
8

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 20 publications
(14 citation statements)
references
References 47 publications
2
10
0
2
Order By: Relevance
“…The regression coefficients of RDI in columns 1 and 3 are significant and negative, indicating a negative effect of RDI on Tobin Q and ROE, respectively. This result is consistent with the proprietary cost theory, litigation cost theory, information procurement cost and prior literature (Ahn et al , 2019; Hope et al , 2016; Greco, 2012). The manager sees risk disclosures as a costly affair and discloses less to avoid litigation complications and proprietary costs .…”
Section: Empirical Findingssupporting
confidence: 92%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…The regression coefficients of RDI in columns 1 and 3 are significant and negative, indicating a negative effect of RDI on Tobin Q and ROE, respectively. This result is consistent with the proprietary cost theory, litigation cost theory, information procurement cost and prior literature (Ahn et al , 2019; Hope et al , 2016; Greco, 2012). The manager sees risk disclosures as a costly affair and discloses less to avoid litigation complications and proprietary costs .…”
Section: Empirical Findingssupporting
confidence: 92%
“…However, management exercises discretion over disclosures and sees the disclosure requirements as a burden (Verrecchia, 1983; Glaum, 2020). The discretion in disclosure primarily depends on its likely impacts (Ahn et al , 2019; Greco, 2012). It is therefore interesting to investigate the impact of risk disclosures on the firm value.…”
Section: Literature Review and Hypothesis Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Prior studies show that, on average, managers withhold bad news and emphasize good news in their public disclosures, and they argue a lot on the effects of the release of bad news if it accumulates up to a threshold [19]. Kothari et al [20] examine that if the bad news leaks and good news reveals in the meanwhile, the negative reaction to the stock price dominates the positive one.…”
Section: Hypothesismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…First, firms in less fire-prone locations may find the wildfire effect on themselves immaterial and, thus, do not need to disclose. Second, given that wildfire risk has negative connotations for firm value, managers might strategically decide to under-report this risk in regulatory filings (Ahn et al 2019;Bao et al 2019;Hutton et al 2009;Kothari et al 2009;Nagar et al 2003). Third, boilerplate disclosure is common to the non-financial sections of 10-K filings.…”
Section: Hypotheses Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…First, wildfire risk reflects one aspect of firms' environmental concerns. Some firms, thus, may prefer to withhold negative news due to its adverse implication for firm value (Ahn et al 2019;Bao et al 2019;Hutton et al 2009;Kothari et al 2009;Nagar et al 2003). This is possible especially when the extent of monitoring and enforcement is limited.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%