Do longer constitutions corrupt?

Pavlik, Jamie Bologna; Jahan, Israt; Young, Andrew T.

doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2022.102319

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 47 publications

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“…Accordingly, there is extensive research on this topic, particularly concerning the influence of political institutions (Knack and Keefer, 1995; North, 1990; Rodrik, 2004). In their significant and innovative contribution, Tsebelis and Nardi (2016a, hereafter Tsebelis and Nardi, 2016b) examine the impact of constitutional design on economic performance, thus contributing both to the research on institutions and economic success and on the field analyzing whether de jure (i.e., written) constitutions matter (e.g., Bologna Pavlik et al, 2023; Callais and Young, 2021; Chilton and Versteeg, 2016, 2017, Voigt, 2011, 2020; Voigt et al, 2015).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do long constitutions really hamper economic performance? A comment on Tsebelis and Nardi (2016a)

Flick Witzig,

Vatter

2024

Research & Politics

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In their contribution, Tsebelis and Nardi (2016a) examine the impact of constitutional design on economic performance. The authors find evidence of a significant negative relationship between constitutional length and economic performance. As we will show here, the results of Tsebelis and Nardi (2016a) are not robust. Several minor adjustments to the models, each on its own, reduce or eliminate the presumed relevance of constitutional length. Moreover, conceptual considerations raise doubts whether the focus on constitutional length is a promising path to follow.

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