Do Judgements about Risk Track Modal Ordering?

Abstract

On the standard conception of risk, the degree to which an event is risky is the function of the probability of that event. Recently, Duncan Pritchard has challenged this view, proposing instead a modal account on which risk is conceived of in terms of modal ordering (2015). On this account, the degree of risk for any given event is a function of its modal distance from the actual world, not its likelihood. Pritchard's main motivation for this is that the probabilistic account cannot always explain our judgements about risk. In certain cases, equally probable events are not judged to be equally risky. Here I will argue that Pritchard's account succumbs to a similar problem. Put simply, there are cases in which judgements about risk decouple from both probability and modal ordering. Thus, if we want a theory of risk that can explain our judgements about risk, neither the probabilistic nor modal account is successful.

Entitlement, Epistemic Risk, and Scepticism

“…Since P is true in very close worlds in Case 1, but only in remote worlds in Case 2, P proves more risky in Case 1 than in Case 2. Bricker (2018) observes that Pritchard's modal account, if working at all, would also explain cases in which our judgements seem to track probability, since probability and modal ordering are often correlated. (For example, note that you seriously bodily injuring yourself from playing chess is both a very improbable event and one that happens only in very remote worlds.)…”

“…Hansson 2018). To avoid sterile complications, I follow Pritchard (2015Pritchard ( , 2016 and Bricker (2018) in setting aside this more technical notion. discovering the bomb before the time it is set to detonate.…”

“…Let me only add that Pritchard (2015Pritchard ( , 2016 has attempted to defend his account by showing that it can illuminate (BOMB) but also by describing independent supporting evidence available in psychology and cognitive sciences. Bricker (2018) has nonetheless adduced alternative empirical evidence that looks incompatible with Pritchard's modal account. Importantly, Bricker has also detailed an imaginary case similar to (BOMB) that prompts judgments about risk that appear unexplainable by both the modal account and the probabilistic account.…”

“…Hansson 2018). To avoid sterile complications, I followPritchard (2015 and 2016) andBricker (2018) in setting aside this more technical notion.…”

Varieties of Risk

“…Pluralism about risk is also suggested by Bricker (2018) who argues that ordinary risk judgments can "track different metrics given different initial conditions" (p.207, n2) (for related discussion, see also Ebert & Robertson (2013, p.55f.)). This has an obvious affinity with the view that we suggest here, though Bricker, unlike us, appears to regard the modal account as providing one such metric and delivering one viable notion of risk.…”