Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?

Abstract

After the non-binding Universal Declaration of Human Rights, many global and regional human rights treaties have been concluded. Critics argue that these are unlikely to have made any actual difference in reality. Others contend that international regimes can improve respect for human rights in state parties, particularly in more democratic countries or countries with a strong civil society devoted to human rights and with transnational links. Our findings suggest that rarely does treaty ratification have unconditional effects on human rights. Instead, improvement in human rights is typically more likely the more democratic the country or the more international non-governmental organizations its citizens participate in. Conversely, in very autocratic regimes with weak civil society, ratification can be expected to have no effect and is sometimes even associated with more rights violation.

Treaties, Tenure, and Torture: The Conflicting Domestic Effects of International Law

“…Scholars argue commitment to IHRTs rarely leads to increased protections (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2007;Hathaway 2002), and treaty-bound states have even been known to violate rights more than otherwise expected (Hill 2010;Vreeland 2008). Although committed states repress less than their uncommitted counterparts (Neumayer 2005), this finding is often attributed to the screening effect of IHRTs: states with good rights practices select into easy obligations (e.g., Hathaway 2007). Are there conditions under which IHRTs actually constrain repression?…”

“…For our purposes, mobilization is a coordinated attempt by nonstate actors within the territorial jurisdiction of the state to use collectively controlled resources to influence political outcomes of any type (Tilly 1978). 2 For a sample of studies of IHRTs and human rights with pessimistic conclusions, see Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2007;Hathaway 2002;Hill 2010;Neumayer 2005;and Vreeland 2008. 3 Courts are effective when they are free from manipulation (e.g., Cross 1999), and when domestic actors are willing and able to punish noncompliance (e.g., Vanberg 2005).…”

The impact of FDI on child labor: Insights from an empirical analysis of sectoral FDI data and case studies

“…There are few (if any) studies that have utilized this variable, and so this is quite novel for the child rights and child policies literature. (A possible exception is the work ofNeumayer (2005) pertaining to the effects of human rights treaties on respect for human rights). To help mitigate the possibility of other factors captured by the CRC variable, we have introduced other RHS variables as noted earlier.…”

The cost of complying with human rights treaties: The convention on the rights of the child and basic immunization

“…The pressure might take the form of NGO-and civil society-initiated mobilization on behalf of treaty goals, the judicial application of treaties and the human rights norms embedded in them to domestic settings, or the empowerment of elements of the executive whose goals are consistent with treaty objectives. Other scholars whose work is broadly consistent with this approach include Hafner-Burton (2008), who finds that the presence of NGOs is associated with (incomplete and transient) compliance with treaties in the area of political rights; Neumayer (2005), who finds that civil society strength increases the likelihood of compliance with human rights treaties; Helfer and Slaughter (1997), who argue that supranational adjudication of human rights treaties in Europe empowered domestic courts and individuals in particular countries; and Powell and Staton (2009), who argue that the effectiveness of the domestic legal regime constrains states' choices to violate human rights.…”