‘Do I have to spell it out?’ Dyslexia, Lexism, and an object of comparison

Abstract

In this article I mount an attack on the problematic conceptions of literacy that lie behind the Standards and Testing Agency's 2015 Interim Teacher Assessment Frameworks at the End of Key Stage 2 and the Key Stage 2 English Grammar, Punctuation and Spelling Tests. I employ an object of comparison (a philosophical method), for attitudes towards literacy and dyslexics. I challenge current conceptions of the Othering of, and discrimination against, dyslexics. I argue for the concept of ‘Lexism’ as an alternative explanatory account for the existence of dyslexics.

Dyslexics and Othering: an anti‐definitional approach to Lexism

“…This philosophical approach to the concepts of Lexism, dyslexia and being a dyslexic is not an attempt to circumvent or avoid understanding such concepts. One can only define what one already understands; this was my purpose in my previous articles in this journal (Collinson, 2012(Collinson, , 2018). If we do not understand those concepts, we cannot seek to create a definition.…”

“…As a dyslexic myself, I do not reject the existence of dyslexics, only that our existence is not reliant on the essentialist (and Lexist) concept of dyslexia. In the second article (Collinson, 2018), I outlined evidence from policy documents which we can understand as part of a Lexist agenda. My purpose in this article is to give a broader conceptual understanding for Lexism; I specifically do not seek a definition.…”

Dyslexia as ‘paradox’

“…I have argued in BJSE , and elsewhere, against dyslexia as a concept, and for what I term ‘Lexism’ (see, for example, Collinson, 2012, 2014, 2018, 2019, 2022). If one adopts Lexism, one rejects dyslexia – the two are competing concepts for the existence of dyslexics.…”

“…The similarity between the social model of dyslexia (Riddick, 2001) and that of Lexism (Collinson, 2014, 2022) is the recognition of the Othering and discrimination of dyslexics. The key difference between the social model of dyslexia and of Lexism is that Riddick (2001) accepts the concept of the ‘impairment’ of dyslexia, whereas I would argue that the concept of ‘dyslexia’ is a Lexist concept (Collinson, 2012, 2018, 2019). My purpose in this article is to further weaken the concept of dyslexia; in exploring dyslexia as a paradox, we are also reflecting upon the conceptual foundations of dyslexia as an impairment.…”