Do Good Borders Make Good Rebels? Territorial Control and Civilian Casualties

Stewart, Megan; Liou, Yu-Ming

doi:10.1086/688699

Cited by 40 publications

(31 citation statements)

References 38 publications

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“…Balcells 2010. Nor would we expect a difference in the effect of domestic versus foreign strongholds (Stewart and Liou 2017) because terrorism is used on territory that is "foreign" to the terrorist group.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 97%

Correlates of Warning: Territory, Democracy, and Casualty Aversion in Terrorist Tactics

Brown¹

2020

Int Org

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Terrorists attack civilian targets but there is variation in how many civilians they kill. Terrorists may deliberately harm civilians, or they may adopt a less bloody approach, demolishing businesses, transit systems, and other civilian property while employing tactics to avert civilian casualties. One such tactic is to warn civilians before an attack, allowing them to flee the area. With warnings as an example, this study considers why terrorists might adopt casualty-aversion tactics. An analysis of 12,235 bombings by 131 terrorist groups in the years 1970 to 2016 finds that warnings are most common when terrorists fight democracies and when they lack territorial strongholds. Ideological factors such as religion are not significant predictors of warnings. These findings suggest a need to revisit the claim that religion incentivizes indiscriminate terrorism. They also suggest a strategic logic behind casualty-aversion tactics. Terrorists fighting democracies may spare civilians to appear legitimate in citizens’ eyes. Terrorists without strongholds may spare civilians because they rely on the state's population for support. At first glance, my findings appear to contradict civil war literature arguing that militants with strongholds use violence more discriminately. However, terrorism occurs in areas of state control. Militants with strongholds can use indiscriminate terrorism against state-governed civilians without alienating their own supporters elsewhere.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 97%

Correlates of Warning: Territory, Democracy, and Casualty Aversion in Terrorist Tactics

Brown¹

2020

Int Org

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“…Promisingly, some recent work recognizes that rebel access to foreign sanctuaries may shift over time. However, these studies examine sponsor-side factors influencing the termination of external support to militants (Karlén 2019), or focus on how gaining access to external havens affects rebel violence (Martínez 2017;Stewart and Liou 2017).…”

Section: Figure 1: Border Control Is a Common Counterinsurgent Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Because the extent to which armed groups victimize civilians is a function of whether they rely on local or external support, civilian victimization is highly responsive to shifts in rebels' resource bases. Local and external resources are generally substitutable, so greater access to external resources reduces the need for domestic civilian support (Weinstein 2007;Stewart and Liou 2017), making civilian victimization more likely.…”

Section: Civilian Victimizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Border Control and Insurgent Tactics

Blair

2020

Preprint

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Where cross-border sanctuary enables rebels to marshal external support, classical theories of counterinsurgency extol the strategic value of border control. By sealing borders, counterinsurgents can erode transnational rebels' resources, degrading the quality of rebellion. Building on theories linking resources and technologies of rebellion, I posit a fortification dilemma inherent in border control strategies. Well-resourced rebels with external support can afford conventional attacks and indiscriminate violence. When counterinsurgent border control efforts interdict foreign logistics, insurgents compensate by cultivating greater local support. In turn, rebels prefer more irregular attacks and reduced civilian victimization. These effects are mitigated when rebels enjoy active sponsorship from state patrons and where rebels can access alternate smuggling routes, both of which subvert counterinsurgents' border interdiction efficacy. Because counterinsurgent border control efforts trade-off reduced insurgent capabilities for greater competition over local hearts-and-minds, border control is best used in tandem with population-centric counterinsurgency. I illustrate this theory with archival evidence from the Algerian War of Independence, and test it using declassified microdata on border fortification and violence in a difference-indifferences setting in Iraq.

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“…Previous observational studies center on the calculated choice rebels make when employing certain tactics (Weinstein, 2006;Stanton, 2013). Rebel violence can generate more complete compliance and establish local order (Kalyvas, 2006), violence against civilians can facilitate resource extraction and recruitment (Stewart and Liou, 2017), the use of sexual violence can improve group cohesion (Cohen, 2013). To varying extents, studies have considered the implications of tactical choice for garnering positive external support.…”

Section: Favorable Perceptions and Prior Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Rebel groups vary widely in the tactics they use to pursue political change, and they make these strategic choices weighing the pros and cons of specific tactics. Existing studies of contentious politics highlight the violent tactics rebel groups use (Salehyan et al, 2014;Thomas, 2014), as well as the consequences of these tactics (Stewart and Liou, 2017;Cohen, 2013). Different violent tactics can quickly bring new recruits (Stewart and Liou, 2017), increase local compliance (Kalyvas, 2006), and enhance group cohesion (Cohen, 2013).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rebel tactics and external public opinion

Arves

Cunningham

McCulloch

2019

Research & Politics

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Rebel groups employ a number of strategies beyond violence, and these alternative tactics are often thought to improve the reputation and legitimacy of rebel actors. How powerful states (and their publics) view rebels can affect their chances of international recognition, inclusion in peace talks, and whether they are eventually successful at achieving their objectives. This study employs two experiments to test the link between rebel tactics and opinions of these rebels held by external audiences. We examine the impact of six rebel behaviors on American public opinion: (a) nonviolent demonstrations, (b) nonviolent interventions (such as blockades and sit ins), (c) social noncooperation (such as hunger strikes), (d) terrorism, (e) stone throwing, and (f) the use of local democratic practice (elections) in rebel groups. We find that the use of elections within rebel actors, demonstrations, and hunger strikes improve positive perceptions of rebels, whereas rebel use of terrorism decreases support.

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Do Good Borders Make Good Rebels? Territorial Control and Civilian Casualties

Cited by 40 publications

References 38 publications

Correlates of Warning: Territory, Democracy, and Casualty Aversion in Terrorist Tactics

Correlates of Warning: Territory, Democracy, and Casualty Aversion in Terrorist Tactics

Border Control and Insurgent Tactics

Rebel tactics and external public opinion

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