Do Fixed Patent Terms Distort Innovation?: Evidence from Cancer Clinical Trials

Budish, Eric; Roin, Benjamin N.; Williams, Heidi

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2353471

Cited by 29 publications

(27 citation statements)

References 63 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…A growing body of research shows that the incentives created by factors including demographics, health policy, and insurance arrangements have substantial effects on innovative activity. Such evidence has been found in the context of vaccine development (Finkelstein 2004), in the broader pharmaceutical context (Acemoglu and Linn 2004), in the development of cancer treatments (Budish et al 2013), and in the development of medical equipment and devices (Clemens 2012). In addition to shaping current care access and health expenditures, Medicare's fee schedule shapes the treatments and tools that will be at physicians' disposal in future years.…”

Section: The Evolution Of Physicians' Practices and The Development Omentioning

confidence: 94%

“…Clemens (2012) finds evidence on Medicare's early effects on innovation in medical equipment and devices. Finkelstein (2004), Acemoglu and Linn (2004), and Budish, Roin and Williams (2013) find evidence that incentives significantly shape innovation in additional health care settings of interest. A key parameter describing physician behavior is the extent to which physicians value patient health relative to net income.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Implications of Physician Ethics, Billing Norms, and Service Cost Structures for Medicare's Fee Schedule

Clemens

2013

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Section: The Evolution Of Physicians' Practices and The Development Omentioning

confidence: 94%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Implications of Physician Ethics, Billing Norms, and Service Cost Structures for Medicare's Fee Schedule

Clemens

2013

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…Our paper contributes to the literature on incentives for innovation in R&D-intensive industries (see, e.g., Newell, Jaffee, and Stavins 1999;Acemoglu and Linn 2004;Finkelstein 2004;and Budish, Roin, and Williams 2013). Most closely related are studies of innovation in healthcare markets by Lakdawalla and Sood (2013) and especially Garber, Jones, and Romer (2006).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 90%

Preventives Versus Treatments

Kremer¹,

Snyder²

2015

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Preventives are sold ex ante, before disease status is realized, while treatments are sold ex post. Even if the mean of the ex ante distribution of consumer values is the same as that ex post, the shape of the distributions may differ, generating a difference between the surplus each product can extract. If, for example, consumers differ only in ex ante disease risk, then a monopolist would have more difficulty extracting surplus with a preventive than with a treatment because treatment consumers, having contracted the disease, no longer differ in disease risk. We show that the ratio of preventive to treatment producer surplus can be arbitrarily small, in particular when the distribution of consumer values has a Zipf shape and the disease is rare. The firm's bias toward treatments can be reversed, for example, if the source of private information is disease severity learned ex post. The difference between the producer surplus earned from the products can result in distorted R&D incentives; the deadweight loss from this distortion can be as large as the entire producer-surplus difference. Calibrations for HIV and heart attacks based on risk factors in the U.S. population suggest that the distribution of disease risk is sufficiently Zipf-similar to generate substantial differences between producer surplus from preventives and treatments. Empirically, we find that proxies for the Zipf-similarity of the disease-risk distribution are associated a significantly lower likelihood of vaccine development but not drug development.

show abstract

“…These costs can vary substantially both with the type of drug and the country of launch. 10 The random e §ects speciÖcation implies that E(!ijt! i 0 jt ) =  5 where  2 (0; 1) is the discount rate.…”

Section: A Model Of Drug Launchmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…2 In the debates over the TRIPS Agreement (and more recently, the proposed TranspaciÖc Partnership trade agreement), developing countries and public health advocacy groups argued that harmonization of patent policy was both unnecessary and harmful when viewed 1 The classic statement of the tradeo § is Arrow (1962), which spawned a huge literature. Empirical studies of the impact of patent rights on the rate and direction of innovation are more recent, and include Branstetter and Sakakibara (2001), Moser (2005), Qian (2007), Kyle and McGahan (2012), Williams (2013), Galasso and Schankerman (2013), and Budish, Roin and Williams (2014). 2 TRIPS is the acronym for the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, which is administered by the World Trade Organization.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Patents and the Global Diffusion of New Drugs

Cockburn¹,

Lanjouw²,

Schankerman³

2014

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This project was initiated by Jean (Jenny) Lanjouw. Tragically, Jenny died in late 2005, but had asked us to complete the project. This took much longer than expected because it involved complete reconstruction of the data set and empirical work. It is essentially a new paper in its current form, but it remains an important part of Jenny's legacy and a topic to which she devoted much of her intellectual and policy efforts. We hope she would be satisfied with our work which, for us, was a labor of love. We thank Judy Chevalier, Alberto Galasso, Matt Gentry, Bronwyn Hall, Saul Lach, Margaret Kyle, Scott Stern, Glen Weyl, Brian Wright, and seminar participants at Berkeley, MIT Sloan School, the USPTO, and numerous other universities for their suggestions on earlier versions of the paper. We are grateful to the World Bank, the Brookings ABSTRACTThis paper studies how patent rights and price regulation affect how fast new drugs are launched in different countries, using newly constructed data on launches of 642 new drugs in 76 countries for the period 1983-2002, and information on the duration and content of patent and price control regimes. Price regulation strongly delays launch, while longer and more extensive patent protection accelerates it. Health policy institutions, and economic and demographic factors that make markets more profitable, also speed up diffusion. The effects are robust to using instruments to control for endogeneity of policy regimes. The results point to an important role for patents and other policy choices in driving the diffusion of new innovations.

show abstract

Do Fixed Patent Terms Distort Innovation?: Evidence from Cancer Clinical Trials

Cited by 29 publications

References 63 publications

Implications of Physician Ethics, Billing Norms, and Service Cost Structures for Medicare's Fee Schedule

Implications of Physician Ethics, Billing Norms, and Service Cost Structures for Medicare's Fee Schedule

Preventives Versus Treatments

Patents and the Global Diffusion of New Drugs

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About