Using issuance data across 50 countries from 1996 through 2009, we examine the role of information asymmetry in market timing globally. We utilize a model that takes into account the possible feedback of security issues to past market returns allowing us to ascertain whether timing of capital issuance around the world is based on information asymmetry. We find evidence of both market timing and pseudo market timing. The evidence for market timing is significantly stronger in international sub-samples with greater levels of information asymmetry when capital issuance is measured by equity share. The evidence for pseudo market timing is consistent across sub-samples when capital issuance is measured by changes in equity issuance. These results suggest that information asymmetry in a market plays an important role in the ability of managers to time capital issuance and that counter to the implications of extant literature, market timing and pseudo market timing are not mutually exclusive, i.e., existence of one does not nullify the other.
JEL classification: C53, G14, G15, G32, Key words: equity issues, market timing, information asymmetry, international evidence
AbstractUsing issuance data across 50 countries from 1996 through 2009, we examine the role of information asymmetry in market timing globally. We utilize a model that takes into account the possible feedback of security issues to past market returns allowing us to ascertain whether timing of capital issuance around the world is based on information asymmetry. We find evidence of both market timing and pseudo market timing. The evidence for market timing is significantly stronger in international sub-samples with greater levels of information asymmetry when capital issuance is measured by equity share. The evidence for pseudo market timing is consistent across sub-samples when capital issuance is measured by changes in equity issuance. These results suggest that information asymmetry in a market plays an important role in the ability of managers to time capital issuance and that counter to the implications of extant literature, market timing and pseudo market timing are not mutually exclusive, i.e., existence of one does not nullify the other.
JEL classification: C53, G14, G15, G32, Key words: equity issues, market timing, information asymmetry, international evidence2 Market timing and pseudo market timing theories differ fundamentally with respect to whether market efficiency holds or not 1 and thus the literature implicitly assumes that market timing and pseudo market timing are mutually exclusive ideas; proof of the existence of one nullifies the existence of the other. Given the important role that information asymmetry plays in market timing, however, it makes sense that the level of information asymmetry in a market would affect the likelihood that market timing could occur. Depending on the relative information asymmetry in a given nation, managers may not be able to exploit their superior knowledge. Conversely, in pseudo market timing, wh...