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2021
DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2020.101613
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Do firms adjust corporate governance in response to economic policy uncertainty? Evidence from board size

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Cited by 40 publications
(45 citation statements)
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References 33 publications
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“…Jensen (1993) argues that large boards also lead to ineffective monitoring for executives as they become so overweight making them highly averse to follow-up. So executives of firms with higher level of control under large boards make them less effective across different functions (Jensen, 1993;Ongsakul et al, 2020). Large boards may be compromising on their controlling and monitoring functions, which weakens the internal governance and shift of power curve turns towards the executives, reflecting the managerial power and executives leading their own influence on their remunerations, which results in higher salaries.…”
Section: Board Sizementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Jensen (1993) argues that large boards also lead to ineffective monitoring for executives as they become so overweight making them highly averse to follow-up. So executives of firms with higher level of control under large boards make them less effective across different functions (Jensen, 1993;Ongsakul et al, 2020). Large boards may be compromising on their controlling and monitoring functions, which weakens the internal governance and shift of power curve turns towards the executives, reflecting the managerial power and executives leading their own influence on their remunerations, which results in higher salaries.…”
Section: Board Sizementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Third, we focus on the UK case, which is unique when relative to other developed and emerging markets. For instance, UK listed firms have diffused ownership (Kilincarslan 2019), while governance structure has significantly changed in response to shocks, such as the 9/11 attacks (Ongsakul et al 2020). Hence, this study offers new insights compared with the former study of Ozkan and Ozkan (2004).…”
mentioning
confidence: 86%
“…Usually, the capital structure varies depending on the characteristics of the industry and their approaches. The consequence of this indicates that all the aforementioned factors may have an effect on a board of directors [12][13][14][15][16][17][18] (Hypotheses 6-8).…”
Section: Shareholders' Rights Interests and Equitabilitymentioning
confidence: 97%