Do Democracies Support Violent Non-governmental Organizations Less Than Autocracies Do?

Goldman, Ogen S.

doi:10.1080/13698249.2017.1297050

Cited by 2 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…Existing scholarship suggests that joint patron-incumbent democracy decreases the chances of rebel aid, but the strength and scope of the effect is unclear (Goldman, 2016; San-Akca, 2016). To determine whether a democratic embargo exists, we employed data from three sources.…”

Section: The Democratic Embargomentioning

confidence: 99%

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The democratic embargo: regime type and proxy war

Grauer

Tierney

2022

European Journal of International Relations

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Democracies rarely fight interstate wars against one another, but democratic dyads frequently engage in hostile acts short of war, such as militarized interstate disputes and the backing of coups. Do democracies wage proxy war against other elected regimes by aiding rebels with weapons and other assistance? Scholars have found that democracies generally avoid doing so—a phenomenon we term the “democratic embargo.” However, the democratic embargo remains under-theorized. Using both datasets and close examination of purported instances of democratic aid to rebels fighting other democracies, we show that the democratic embargo is stronger than first thought. In addition, we explain the democratic embargo by arguing that strong democratic institutions prevent elected leaders from engaging in proxy war against sister regimes, and embargo violations tend to occur when democratic institutions are weak. We test our theory in two ways. First, using large-N qualitative analysis (LNQA), we examine all potential exceptions to the democratic embargo between 1945 and 2011 to establish the external validity of our claim. Second, we use case studies of the Irish decision not to aid rebels fighting the United Kingdom in Northern Ireland and Pakistan’s decision to support rebels fighting India in Kashmir to assess the internal validity of our theoretical logic. The results provide clear support for our institutional explanation of the democratic embargo. Our argument has significant implications for the democratic peace theory, the study of proxy wars, and the capacity of democracies to fight rebellions.

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Section: The Democratic Embargomentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Existing scholarship suggests that democracies routinely aid rebels fighting non-democracies, but they are less likely to provide such support to rebels battling elected governments (Goldman, 2016; San-Akca, 2016). However, research on the democratic embargo remains underdeveloped.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The democratic embargo: regime type and proxy war

Grauer

Tierney

2022

European Journal of International Relations

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“…The other two (Yoon 1997;Goldman 2017), drop most of the variation in distance from their data. Yoon (1997) analyzes only the United States, while Goldman (2017) confines his analysis to politically relevant dyads 4 and states that are observed to have intervened and only investigates rebel biased interventions as a dependent variable.…”

Section: Actor-centric Explanations Of Interventionmentioning

confidence: 92%

“…Except for Kathman (2010), scholars have repeatedly found that alliance ties increase the likelihood of intervention (Lemke and Regan 2004;Fordham 2008;Kathman 2011, Klosek 2020, particularly government-biased intervention (Findley and Teo 2006;Stojek and Chacha 2015). Rivalries, inversely, increase the likelihood that a rival state will undertake a rebel-biased intervention (Findley and Teo 2006;Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2005;Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011;Goldman 2017). This effect is evident in the overwhelming evidence that interventions were more likely during the Cold War (Regan 1998;Lemke and Regan 2004;Mullenbach and Matthews 2008;Kathman 2010;Stojek and Chacha 2015;Bove, Gleditsch, and Sekeris 2016;Bove and Böhmelt 2019).…”

Section: Actor-centric Explanations Of Interventionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Intervention and the politics of information: US attention to foreign civil conflict

Winjum¹

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To improve scholarly understanding of the domestic drivers of third-party intervention in civil conflicts, this dissertation borrows a theoretical framework from the policy process literature. Specifically, I explain intervention through the lens of punctuated equilibrium theory (PET), a view which holds that the attention of government policymakers to most issues is persistently low but can be suddenly and dramatically mobilized. To apply this theory to the study of intervention, I collect data on US congressional speeches and US news coverage of foreign civil conflicts, 1946-1999. I then use the data to investigate the correlates of senior policymaker attention and its effects on intervention decisions. With respect to correlates, I find clear evidence that PET mechanisms motivate US congressional attention to civil conflict: I find that the distribution of change in attention to civil conflicts is leptokurtic, that civil conflicts are more likely to reach the attention of US senior policymakers if they have already reached the attention of actors lower in the policy process, and that congressional attention is subject to crowding effects. With respect to effects on policy, my findings are mixed. Congressional attention increases the likelihood of intervention when I look at all interventions but, when looking at only major interventions and controlling for prior US intervention, I find congressional attention has no statistically significant effect.

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Do Democracies Support Violent Non-governmental Organizations Less Than Autocracies Do?

Cited by 2 publications

References 69 publications

The democratic embargo: regime type and proxy war

The democratic embargo: regime type and proxy war

Intervention and the politics of information: US attention to foreign civil conflict

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