2015
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2550820
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Do Contractionary Monetary Policy Shocks Expand Shadow Banking?

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Cited by 26 publications
(54 citation statements)
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References 49 publications
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“…As can be seen in Figure , a contractionary interest rate shock has no significant impact on broker–dealer leverage and stock prices, evidence against a supply of leverage shock. This finding is consistent with Nelson et al () who find that the contribution of monetary policy shocks on asset growth in the financial sector as a whole has been small.…”
Section: Identification With Sign Restrictionssupporting
confidence: 92%
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“…As can be seen in Figure , a contractionary interest rate shock has no significant impact on broker–dealer leverage and stock prices, evidence against a supply of leverage shock. This finding is consistent with Nelson et al () who find that the contribution of monetary policy shocks on asset growth in the financial sector as a whole has been small.…”
Section: Identification With Sign Restrictionssupporting
confidence: 92%
“…Our results, on the basis of quarterly data over the period 1967:1–2014:3, show that monetary policy and broker–dealer leverage shocks produce responses consistent with a priori expectations about the macroeconomic effects of monetary policy and broker–dealer leverage. They are consistent with those reported by Nelson, Pinter, and Theodoridis () in the context of a sign‐restricted VAR. Our results also show that broker–dealer leverage shocks can significantly affect stock prices, thus supporting the theoretical model of Adrian et al().…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 91%
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“…Begenau and Landvoigt (2017) and Moreira and Savov (2017) are focused on modeling shadow banks that introduce financial fragility into the macroeconomy in the form of run risk or liquidity crunches, respectively. Gertler et al (2016); Meeks et al (2017); Nelson et al (2017); Fève and Pierrard (2017) focus on the wholesale funding aspect of shadow banks. The shadow banks are either modeled as borrowing funds primarily from retail banks funded by the households as in Gertler et al (2016), or as securitizers of bank loans that relax regulatory constraints on commercial banks as in Meeks et al (2017); Nelson et al (2017); Fève and Pierrard (2017).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Gertler et al (2016); Meeks et al (2017); Nelson et al (2017); Fève and Pierrard (2017) focus on the wholesale funding aspect of shadow banks. The shadow banks are either modeled as borrowing funds primarily from retail banks funded by the households as in Gertler et al (2016), or as securitizers of bank loans that relax regulatory constraints on commercial banks as in Meeks et al (2017); Nelson et al (2017); Fève and Pierrard (2017). Mendicino et al (2018) studies the optimal dynamic capital requirements in a model that allows for bank lending and direct household financing of investment.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%