Do authoritarian institutions mobilize economic cooperation?

Escribà‐Folch, Abel

doi:10.1007/s10602-008-9052-6

Cited by 10 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…Notwithstanding the potential for negative consequences, the presence of domestic institutions—particularly parties and legislatures—is linked to regime survival and regeneration. They help to generate domestic economic resources, and they can provide a more efficient way to allocate rents and promote targeted spending (Escriba‐Folch ; Gandhi and Przeworski ; Magaloni ; Svolik ; Wright ). To the extent that institutions help to make rulers seem more legitimate, thus encouraging the belief that existing institutions are appropriate, it increases citizen satisfaction and discourages elite defection and challenges (Lipset ).…”

Section: Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Autocracies and Terrorism: Conditioning Effects of Authoritarian Regime Type on Terrorist Attacks

Wilson

Piazza

2013

American J Political Sci

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Although empirical research has generally demonstrated that democracies experience more terrorism than autocracies, research suggests that this depends upon complex institutional differences that go beyond the democracy-autocracy divide. This study examines these differences, linking institutions to strategies of coercion and co-optation. Using zero-inflated negative binomial regression estimations on Geddes ' (2003) autocratic regime-type data for 161 countries between 1970 and 2006, we find that single-party authoritarian regimes consistently experience less domestic and international terrorism relative to military autocracies and democracies. This finding is robust to a large number of specifications, underscoring the explanatory power of regime type for predicting terrorism. Our explanation for these findings is that party-based autocracies have a wider range of coercion and co-option strategies that they can employ to address grievance and dissent than do other, more strategically restricted, regimes.T he literature on terrorism considers regime type to be an important factor determining which countries experience higher levels of terrorist attacks. The overwhelming bulk of studies fixate on the relationship between democracy and terrorism, arguing that democratic institutions that provide for policy concessions and tolerate political opposition activity make terrorism more likely. Indeed, most empirical studies published in the past 15 years find that democratic regimes are more likely to contain terrorist movements and experience terrorist attacks (Blomberg and Rosendorff

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Section: Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Autocracies and Terrorism: Conditioning Effects of Authoritarian Regime Type on Terrorist Attacks

Wilson

Piazza

2013

American J Political Sci

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“…The winning coalition in this case usually comprises a reduced set of individuals with family, ethnic or clan ties to the leader. Very limited administrative capacity and weak institutionalisation render these regimes extremely dependent on revenue streams, like taxes on international trade and non‐tax revenues, for buying their cronies' loyalty (Bates 2008; Escribà‐Folch 2009). 7 This political logic in neo‐patrimonial regimes further translates into a distinctive set of policies (producing what are often referred as ‘control regimes’) comprising: a closed economy; the distortion of key prices in the macroeconomy; the promotion and regulation of industries; and the regulation of markets (Ndulu et al.…”

Section: Crises Learning Politics and Reformsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Learning, political regimes and the liberalisation of trade

Meseguer

Escribà‐Folch

2010

European Journal of Political Research

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In this article, the probability of opening to trade is related to a country's propensity to learn from other countries in its region. It is argued that countries have different motivations to learn, depending upon the responsiveness and accountability of their political regimes. Whereas democracies cannot afford to be dogmatic, authoritarian regimes are less motivated to learn from the experience of others, even if they embrace policies that fail. Using data on trade liberalisation for 57 developing countries in the period 1970–1999, it is found that democracies confronting economic crises are more likely to liberalise trade as a result of learning; among democracies, presidential systems seem to learn more, whereas personalist dictatorial regimes are the most resistant to learning from the experience of others

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“…Therefore, they may increase their military capabilities (Lektzian & Sprecher, 2007). According to Escriba `-Folch (2009), if sanctions create a considerable reduction in external revenues, they can reduce the amount of patronage that the dictator provides to his supporters through public spending.…”

Section: Concluding Remarks and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The impact of negative oil shocks on military spending and democracy in the oil states of the greater Middle East: Implications for the oil sanctions

Dizaji

2022

Journal of Peace Research

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This study examines how negative oil shocks affect military expenditures and the quality of democracy in the oil rentier states of the greater Middle East using annual data from 1990 to 2018, inclusive. The theoretical analysis suggests that a reduction in oil revenues decreases the government spending on patronages and public goods and may challenge the political power of the incumbent leader. The results of the impulse response functions based on the estimated panel vector autoregressive models indicate that the responses of the military burden and non-military expenditures (as a percentage of GDP) to negative oil shocks become negative and statistically significant after three to four years. Reductions in the financial capability of a rentier government and spending on patronages improve the political environment and quality of democracy. However, this political improvement takes some time to develop as the government may resist the reduction in its expenditures during the initial phase of oil shocks. The policy implication of these results is informative for organizations and policymakers interested in the security and political impact of oil sanctions. Restrictions on oil exports decrease the military spending of the oil rentier states and improve their democracy indices in the long run, although the short-run impacts can be negative. These results are not sensitive to different proxies for oil abundance, alternative data on military expenditures, different indicators of democracy, and different groups of oil-dependent countries.

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Do authoritarian institutions mobilize economic cooperation?

Abstract: Authoritarianism, Dictatorship, Taxation, Institutions, H24, H27, H71,

Cited by 10 publications

References 41 publications

Autocracies and Terrorism: Conditioning Effects of Authoritarian Regime Type on Terrorist Attacks

Autocracies and Terrorism: Conditioning Effects of Authoritarian Regime Type on Terrorist Attacks

Learning, political regimes and the liberalisation of trade

The impact of negative oil shocks on military spending and democracy in the oil states of the greater Middle East: Implications for the oil sanctions

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