Do affective desires provide reasons for action?

Abstract

It is widely assumed that desires can contribute to what it is rational for one to do. Some desires rationalise action in virtue of reasons on which they are based. For instance, suppose I learn that the restaurant next door serves the best falafel in town, and I form a desire to dine there for that reason. If I were to act on this desire, my action would be rationalised by that reason. Some philosophers have argued that there are desires that rationalise actions without being based on reasons. Some desires, it is claimed, have the power to provide reasons. This paper focuses on arguments by Ruth Chang and, more recently, by Declan Smithies and Jeremy Weiss, that claim that such desires provide reasons without being based on reasons in virtue of having an affective nature. §2 clarifies the operative notion of desire and outlines the two main accounts of affective desire. §3 clarifies the claim that desires are capable of 'providing' reasons by distinguishing several distinct formulations of the thesis. I then apply them to extant accounts of affective desires to clarify the sense in which such desires provide reasons. §4 evaluates a key argument by Chang that affective desires constitute normative reasons for action. §5 motivates scepticism concerning explanations of why desires are rationally significant that appeal to their conscious phenomenology. I outline an alternative approach that centralises the function of such experiences.