Do Adverse Childhood Experiences Make Us More Utilitarian in Moral Dilemmas?

Abstract

Purpose Adverse childhood experiences (ACEs) have been associated with various aspects of morality, but their precise impact on moral decision-making remains unclear. This study aims to explore how ACEs influence moral decision-making in sacrificial dilemmas. Methods Study 1 employed traditional dilemma analysis to quantify utilitarian responses and compare them among groups with no, low, and high ACEs. Study 2 utilized the CNI model to quantify three determinants of moral decision-making: sensitivity to consequences (C parameter), sensitivity to norms (N parameter), and general action tendencies (I parameter). Differences in these parameters among groups with no, low, and high ACEs were investigated. Results Both Study 1 and Study 2 revealed that the high-ACE and low-ACE groups showed significantly higher utilitarian responses compared to the no-ACE group. However, no notable differences emerged between the high-ACE and low-ACE groups. Study 2 found that the N parameter was significantly lower in the high-ACE group compared to the low and no-ACE groups. Similarly, the low-ACE group exhibited significantly lower scores in the N parameter compared to the no-ACE group. Additionally, no significant differences were observed in the C and I parameters among groups with no, low, and high ACEs. Conclusion These findings suggest that individuals with a high number of ACEs tend to exhibit more utilitarian responses, attributed to decreased affective response to the violation of moral rules, rather than increased deliberative cost-benefit reasoning or a general preference for action. Such insights deepen our understanding of the precise aspects of moral decision-making influenced by ACEs.