DNS Security (DNSSEC) Opt-In

Arends, Roy; Kosters, M.; Blacka, David

doi:10.17487/rfc4956

Cited by 6 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…For simplicity, our definition above considers only the case where the set R is static; R is chosen when the primary sets up the zone and does not change afterwards. 6 We will require the above four algorithms to satisfy three properties: Completeness, Soundness, and Privacy.…”

Section: A Algorithms For the Parties In Psr Systemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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NSEC5: Provably Preventing DNSSEC Zone Enumeration

Goldberg

Naor

Papadopoulos

et al. 2015

Proceedings 2015 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium

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We use cryptographic techniques to study zone enumeration in DNSSEC. DNSSEC is designed to prevent attackers from tampering with domain name system (DNS) messages. The cryptographic machinery used in DNSSEC, however, also creates a new vulnerability, zone enumeration, enabling an adversary to use a small number of online DNSSEC queries combined with offline dictionary attacks to learn which domain names are present or absent in a DNS zone. We prove that the current DNSSEC standard, with NSEC and NSEC3 records, inherently suffers from zone enumeration: specifically, we show that security against (1) attackers that tamper with DNS messages and (2) privacy against zone enumeration cannot be satisfied simultaneously, unless the DNSSEC nameserver performs online public-key cryptographic operations. We then propose a new construction that uses online publickey cryptography to solve the problem of DNSSEC zone enumeration. NSEC5 can be thought of as a variant of NSEC3, in which the unkeyed hash function is replaced with a deterministic RSA-based keyed hashing scheme. With NSEC5, a zone remains protected against network attackers and compromised nameservers even if the secret NSEC5-hashing key is compromised; leaking the NSEC5-hashing key only harms privacy against zone enumeration, effectively downgrading the security of NSEC5 back to that of the current DNSSEC standard (with NSEC3).

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Section: A Algorithms For the Parties In Psr Systemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Opt-out. Finally, the structural similarity of NSEC5 with NSEC3 and NSEC allows for easy adoption of existing DNSSEC mechanisms such as wildcards, Opt-out [23], [30] and Opt-in [6]. We will address these details in future work.…”

Section: B Practical Considerations and Compatibility With Dnssecmentioning

confidence: 99%