Divisions over Distinctions in Wartime International Law

Bohrer, Ziv; Dill, Janina; Duffy, Helen

doi:10.1017/9781108674416.003

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…150 The jus ad bellum avoids this by placing geographic and temporal constraints on where force may be lawfully used in self-defence. 151 At present, there is "considerable clarity regarding IHL's spatial application boundaries" in an IAC: 152 namely, the territory of the state parties to the conflict but not the territory of uninvolved states. 153 Ensuring uses of force on the territory of third states remain subject to a fresh jus ad bellum analysis safeguards this clarity.…”

Section: Factors Favouring the Jus Ad Bellummentioning

confidence: 99%

Qassem Soleimani, Targeted Killing of State Actors, and Executive Order 12,333

Molloy¹

2021

VUWLR

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The targeted killing of the Iranian military leader Qassem Soleimani in an American drone strike in January 2020 marked a novel development in the operation of the United States' drone programme; targeting a member of a state's armed forces as opposed to a member of a non-state armed group. Soleimani's killing offers an opportunity to re-examine the scope of Executive Order 12,333, which prohibits employees of the United States Government from committing assassinations. This article applies Executive Order 12,333's "assassination ban" to the Soleimani strike. The assassination ban's scope varies depending on whether it is applied in a wartime or peacetime context. This article concludes from the surrounding factual and legal context that the strike should be analysed according to the peacetime definition of assassination, which necessitates an analysis of the strike's compliance with the jus ad bellum, the legal framework applicable to uses of interstate force. It finds that the strike's non-compliance with the jus ad bellum, in addition to its likely political motive create a strong argument that the strike would constitute a prohibited assassination under the terms of the Executive Order, but the legal framework surrounding the Executive Order limits its direct enforceability with respect to presidentially authorised uses of force. It ultimately concludes that, despite the assassination ban's lack of direct enforceability, it nevertheless creates a strong normative counterbalance against an increasing tendency toward expansive uses of extraterritorial force.

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Section: Factors Favouring the Jus Ad Bellummentioning

confidence: 99%

Qassem Soleimani, Targeted Killing of State Actors, and Executive Order 12,333

Molloy¹

2021

VUWLR

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The Direct Rights of Individuals in the International Law of Armed Conflict

Peters

2023

The Individualization of War

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When ascribing individual rights, there is a difference between legal rules which embody ‘objective’ standards of protection that impose obligations or duties on obligors, and rules which additionally confer ‘subjective’ rights on those persons whom the rules seek to protect. In this chapter, Anne Peters examines whether, and under what conditions, international humanitarian law (IHL) generates such individual rights, and against whom. Since case law has yet to settle which rules in IHL actually generate individual rights, this must be determined in each case by interpreting the provisions or by clarifying the content of the underlying norm of customary law. Therefore, further study must identify how to recognize an individual IHL-based right and which types of rights exist. In doing so, Peters concludes that the acknowledgement of IHL-based rights endorses the individual human being as the normative reference point of IHL. Thus, Peters asserts that the individualization of IHL has not reached its limits. The principal modern purpose of IHL—to protect humans from the calamities of war—is best pursued by acknowledging direct IHL-based, special individual rights, rather than falling in the two extremes: either applying human rights across the board or denying individual rights altogether.

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The Pitfalls and Promises of Human Rights Claims in the Chechen Wars: Russia at the European Court

Evangelista

2020

European Review of International Studies

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Russia’s brutal wars against the separatist republic of Chechnya, starting in the mid-1990s, entailed untold numbers of war crimes and human rights abuses, including kidnapping, extrajudicial killings, torture, murder, and vast destruction of property and civilian life by aerial bombardment and artillery barrages. Blocked from pursuing justice through the Russian courts or by having the Russian government fulfill its obligations under the Geneva Conventions, victims instead worked with activists and lawyers to bring cases before the European Court of Human Rights. Starting in 2003, the Court has found against Russia in some 250 cases – in effect bringing the higher standards of human rights law to the domain of armed conflict, normally regulated (with mixed success) by international humanitarian law (“laws of war”). The first step in the process of understanding this normative change is to identify and understand the transformation: from a normative standpoint, the Court rulings constitute a major achievement for civilian protections during wartime; they build on earlier precedents in cases against Turkey and the United Kingdom, which not only expand protections for civilians but also extend the espace juridique of the Court’s competence beyond Europe to include, for example, British military forces in Iraq. The second step provides a social-sciences perspective by adding an empirical dimension to the study of these cases. We see that the actual consequences of the Court’s decisions on the military practices of Russia and other states have been limited and may even portend a backlash that could undermine protections for civilians in warfare. The last step of normative analysis suggests that even if appeals to a court of human rights might not serve the goal of reducing war crimes in general, the use of human-rights norms retains a certain plausibility to the extent that if offers victims an opportunity to present their claims and seek remedies.

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Divisions over Distinctions in Wartime International Law

Cited by 3 publications

References 75 publications

Qassem Soleimani, Targeted Killing of State Actors, and Executive Order 12,333

Qassem Soleimani, Targeted Killing of State Actors, and Executive Order 12,333

The Direct Rights of Individuals in the International Law of Armed Conflict

The Pitfalls and Promises of Human Rights Claims in the Chechen Wars: Russia at the European Court

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