Divine Commands and Moral Requirements

Abstract

The view that morality in some way depends, at least in part, upon the will of God is an important theme in the history of philosophy. In recent times this idea has not been taken very seriously by prominent moral philosophers. It is often assumed that the view has been refuted or can be shown to be quite implausible in the light of accepted modern doctrine about morality. Based on the belief that this assumption is mistaken, this book takes a fresh look at this issue. It asks whether some version of the claim that human morality depends upon divine commands can be defended against serious and sustained philosophical criticism. It explores whether significantly different versions of divine command theory can be formulated. And, finally, it attempts to discover whether divine command theories are consistent with or can be grafted on to other recent theories of the logic of some of the moral concepts.

Restricted Theological Voluntarism

“…(This suggestion about goodness is worked out powerfully and elegantly in the first few chapters of Adams 1999, in which Adams argues that all goodness is to be understood in terms of resemblance to God.) And, as noted above, while Quinn (1978) offers voluntarist accounts of both the good and the right, Quinn too soon followed (1979) Adams and Alston in putting voluntarist accounts of the good to the side while insisting on a voluntarist account of the right. This is a narrowing of the potential scope of the theological voluntarist research program.…”

“Theism, Naturalism, and Meta‐Ethics”

“…Many contemporary theistic philosophers believe that it does. In recent years, divine command theory has enjoyed something of a renaissance, due primarily to the work of Robert Adams (see Adams 1999; also Alston 1989;Quinn 1978), who has applied the strategy outlined above in developing a reductive theological moral realism. Adams's meta-ethical account rests on two distinctions that have often been overlooked.…”

How to Vanquish the Lingering Shadow of the Long-Dead God

“…For a guide to the complexity of the dialectical landscape occupied by the various versions of theological voluntarism, see Murphy (2012). For a nuanced and sophisticated defense of one version of theological voluntarism, see Quinn (1978). For a theistic approach that rejects theological voluntarism (and also natural law theory), see Murphy (2011). good solely because God wills it, we may now intelligibly wonder why the mere fact that God chose to usher this moral order rather than some other into being should suffice for its goodness.…”