2008
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5957.2008.02074.x
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Dividend Policy and Reputation

Abstract: We examine the role of reputation when firms use dividends to signal their profitability. We analyze a signaling model in which reputation plays no role in equilibrium. We then show that taking reputation into account as a link between sequential dividend decisions makes it possible to endogenize signaling costs and obtain a separating equilibrium. Lastly, we use the reversibility hypothesis and assume that in each period, managers can reverse their choices in terms of dividend distribution. We find that in mo… Show more

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Cited by 16 publications
(16 citation statements)
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“… Rozeff (1982),Eades (1982),Baskin (1989),Gillet et al (2008),Carter and Schmidt (2008), and many others, present similar results regarding the dividend-risk relationship.…”
mentioning
confidence: 63%
“… Rozeff (1982),Eades (1982),Baskin (1989),Gillet et al (2008),Carter and Schmidt (2008), and many others, present similar results regarding the dividend-risk relationship.…”
mentioning
confidence: 63%
“…Yilmaz and Gulay (2006) found in their study that ''prices start to rise a few sessions before cash dividend payments; and on the ex-dividend day; they fall less than do dividend payments; finally decreasing in the sessions following the payment; trading volume shows a considerable upward shift before the payment date; is stable after, therefore, cash dividends influence prices and trading volumes in different ways before, at, and after payment, providing some profitable active trading strategy opportunities around the ex-dividend day''. Gillet, Lapointe and Raimbourg (2008) claimed that the signalling equilibrium becomes unbalanced, originating any dividend signalling policy to become difficult to implement. Dhanani (2005) argued that the research results sustain dividend proposition related to signalling and ownership structure, in liking to those about capital structure and investment decisions and agency issues.…”
Section: IImentioning
confidence: 99%
“…There is also a literature that studies the market reactions on the reputation built by dividend payout policy of firms. The models of Gillet, Lapointe, and Raimbourg (2008) suggest that firm managers who decide to signal the quality of their projects via a dividend policy establish a stable dividend policy when the information they hold is favorable. Furthermore, their models imply that investors would respond favorably to the increase of dividend yields by the firms that have established a dividend reputation.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%