2014
DOI: 10.2753/ree1540-496x5004s407
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Dividend Payout-Policy Drivers: Evidence from Emerging Countries

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Cited by 41 publications
(40 citation statements)
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References 29 publications
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“…The theoretical position manifested by Lintner (1956) reveals that dividends are paid out of profits; that is why it is impossible for an unprofitable company to pay dividends. Literature suggests several drivers of the corporate profitability, such as good corporate governance practices, (Ahmad 2015), high investor protection, (Boţoc and Pirtea 2014), close corporate monitoring by institutional shareholders, (Chang et al 2016;Jacob and Lukose 2018), regulatory consideration, (Kasozi and Ngwenya 2015), and minimum agency problem (Jacob and Michaely 2017). From these authors, one may deduce that companies with good corporate governance, sound regulatory support, high investor protection, strong corporate monitoring by institutional shareholders, and minimum agency problems are more profitable as compared to those companies with poor corporate governance practices, lower investor protection, weak corporate control by institutional shareholders, and having agency problems.…”
Section: Related Literature and Hypothesis Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The theoretical position manifested by Lintner (1956) reveals that dividends are paid out of profits; that is why it is impossible for an unprofitable company to pay dividends. Literature suggests several drivers of the corporate profitability, such as good corporate governance practices, (Ahmad 2015), high investor protection, (Boţoc and Pirtea 2014), close corporate monitoring by institutional shareholders, (Chang et al 2016;Jacob and Lukose 2018), regulatory consideration, (Kasozi and Ngwenya 2015), and minimum agency problem (Jacob and Michaely 2017). From these authors, one may deduce that companies with good corporate governance, sound regulatory support, high investor protection, strong corporate monitoring by institutional shareholders, and minimum agency problems are more profitable as compared to those companies with poor corporate governance practices, lower investor protection, weak corporate control by institutional shareholders, and having agency problems.…”
Section: Related Literature and Hypothesis Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Various measures of dividend pay-out ratio have been found in existing literature to include dividend yield, dividend-to-earnings ratio, and dividend-to-asset ratio. This paper adopts dividend-to-asset ratio in line with Aivazian et al (2003) and Botoc and Pirtea (2014) to avoid problems that may arise with pricing and volatile earnings when earnings are manipulated to paint a particular picture of the organization using some loopholes in accounting. The independent variables include profitability, firm size, business risk, financial leverage, and liquidity and growth opportunities…”
Section: Study Variablesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…De Cesari (2012) examine the listed non-financial Italian companies and show that share of cash dividends in total payout (i.e., cash dividends plus repurchases) increases as the wedge between control and cash flow rights of the controlling shareholder widens. There is also empirical evidence that companies in emerging countries with weak investor protection have higher dividend payouts for enhancing reputation irrespective of the company risk (Botoc & Pirtea, 2014). Another study finds that as the stake of founding families increases, companies tend to have higher dividend payouts to create a reputation for the fair treatment of minority shareholders (Isakov & Weisskopf, 2015).…”
Section: The Reputation Building (Substitution) and The Outcome Hypotmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Turkey is a civil law country, and it is characterised by a weak shareholder protection setting (Mitton, 2004;Botoc & Pirtea, 2014). In countries where shareholder protection is weak, minority shareholders are not powerful enough to extract dividends (La Porta et al, 2000).…”
Section: Turkish Business Settings and Hypothesesmentioning
confidence: 99%