Dividend Payments by Russian Companies: A Signal to the Market or a Consequence of Agency Conflicts?

Abstract

The article analyzes the dividend policies of Russian companies using two dividend payment theories: signaling theory and agency cost theory. A sample of 30 Russian companies over the period 2010–2021 is used. To test the applicability of signaling theory, pooled regression and fixed effects models are developed. It is shown that an increase/reduction in dividend payments exceeding 20% in the current year allows one to predict an increase/decrease in the return on assets in one or two subsequent years (in comparison to the year preceding dividend payments). However, the growth rate of dividend payments shows no stable relationship with the future return on assets. To test the applicability of agency cost theory, a Tobit model is used with the participation of a principal majority shareholder represented by the government as the dependent variable. This binary variable is equal to 1 if the government owns directly or indirectly over 30% of corporate stocks and 0 otherwise. The results do not confirm the applicability of agency theory to the Russian market. Government participation in stock capital exerts no significant impact on the dividend payout ratio. These findings contribute to understanding the relationship between a company’s dividend policy and its future financial performance, providing a useful tool for Russian investors.