Divided government, delegation, and civil service reform

Abstract

This paper sheds new light on the drivers of civil service reform in US states. We first demonstrate theoretically that divided government is a key trigger of civil service reform, providing nuanced predictions for specific configurations of divided government. We then show empirical evidence for these predictions using data from the second half of the 20th century: states tended to introduce these reforms under divided government, and in particular when legislative chambers (rather than legislature and governor) were divided.

Divided Government and Polarization: Regression-Discontinuity Evidence from US States

“…Knowing they will have to compromise, in order to obtain their desired policy outcome, parties have incentives to run on more polarized platforms than they would if they had full control (Alesina and Rosenthal, 2000). This mechanism may help reconcile the apparently contrasting results found in earlier empirical work, which finds that while divided governments may lead to inter-branch conflict and a more difficult legislative process, they are often rather successful in implementing important, bipartisan reforms (see, e.g., Bernecker 2016 andAsh, Morelli andVannoni 2020).…”

“…On the one hand, some empirical studies suggest that split control harms the correct functioning of the government, by lowering legislative productivity (although not all agree, see, e.g., Mayhew 2005;Binder 2004; Kirkland and Phillips 2020 and references therein), delaying budget approval (Klarner, Phillips and Muckler, 2012;Kirkland and Phillips, 2018) and reducing governments' ability to react to economic shocks (Alt and Lowry, 1994). Others, instead, find positive effects, with divided governments being more likely to implement important legislation, such as welfare and civil service reforms (Bernecker, 2016;Ash, Morelli and Vannoni, 2020). One possible explanation for why previous work presents seemingly conflicting evidence could be that providing credible exogenous variation in divided control is challenging.…”