Divided Government and Congressional Investigations

Abstract

This article explores the political determinants of congressional investigatory activity. Using Mayhew's list of high‐profile probes updated through 2006, we developed five measures of the frequency and intensity of investigative oversight. Contra Mayhew, we found that divided government spurs congressional investigatory activity. A shift from unified to divided government yields a five‐fold increase in the number of hearings held and quadruples their duration. Conditional party government models also offer explanatory leverage because homogeneous majorities are more likely to investigate the president in divided government and less likely to do so in unified government. This dynamic is strongest in the House, but analyses of the Senate also afford consistent, if muted, evidence of partisan agenda control.

Scandal Potential: How Political Context and News Congestion Affect the President's Vulnerability to Media Scandal

“…68 See, for example, Ginsberg and Shefter 2002. 69 Kriner and Schwartz 2008;Mayhew 2005;Parker and Dull 2009;Parker and Dull 2013. 70 Because the independent counsel was only in effect for six months under unified government after 1980 (July-December 1994), it is not possible to adequately separate the effects of the statute from divided government more generally.…”

Investigating the President: Committee Probes and Presidential Approval, 1953–2006

“…For this aim, Mayhew sought to identify only high-profile ''publicity probes,'' those that attracted 20 or more days of front-page coverage in the New York Times. Some subsequent studies have continued to use Mayhew's list but disaggregated it to account for the varying intensity of the investigations in question (Kriner and Schwartz 2008). Others have endeavored to cast a wider net and identify a broader range of investigations than those captured by Mayhew's criteria (Parker and Dull 2009).…”

“…Chief executives with lower approval ratings may be more attractive targets for investigations; indeed, both Kriner and Schwartz (2008) and Parker and Dull (2009) find evidence of an inverse relationship between approval and investigative activity. 8 To account for this potential endogeneity, we use two-stage least-squares regression to estimate the effect of investigative activity on presidential approval purged of any reciprocal relationship.…”

“…O ver the past century, members of Congress have held thousands of days of hearings highlighting alleged misconduct and abuses of power within the executive branch (e.g., Kriner and Schwartz 2008;Mayhew 1991;Dull 2009, 2013). Do these investigations have any impact on the president's political capital?…”

“…A number of studies demonstrate the influence of divided government, ideological polarization, and other factors on investigative activity (e.g., Kriner and Schwartz 2008;Mayhew 1991;Dull 2009, 2013). Other studies have examined the interrelationships between investigators and the mass media in determining which charges rise onto the political agenda and which ones fail to do so (Nyhan n.d;Thompson 2000.…”