2010
DOI: 10.1177/0048393110381212
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Diversity and Dissent in the Social Sciences

Abstract: I introduce a case study from organization studies to argue that social epistemologists' recommendation to cultivate diversity and dissent in science is unlikely to be welcomed in the social sciences unless it is coupled with another epistemic ideal: the norm of epistemic responsibility. The norm of epistemic responsibility enables me to show that organization scholars' concern with the fragmentation of their discipline is generated by false assumptions: the assumption that a diversity of theoretical approache… Show more

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Cited by 18 publications
(17 citation statements)
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“…The literature on collective acceptance aims to understand community-wide scientific changes (Gilbert 2000;Andersen 2010), expert advisory committees (Beatty 2006), and scientific manifestos (Bouvier 2004). The literature on trust aims to account for the role of moral virtues in science (Hardwig 1991), the epistemic importance of gender and race equality in science (Rolin 2002;Wray 2007a), and relations between scientific and lay communities (Grasswick 2010;Anderson 2011). In this section I discuss the role of values in collective acceptance, and in the next section I discuss the role of values in trust-based acceptance.…”
Section: Values In Collectivementioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…The literature on collective acceptance aims to understand community-wide scientific changes (Gilbert 2000;Andersen 2010), expert advisory committees (Beatty 2006), and scientific manifestos (Bouvier 2004). The literature on trust aims to account for the role of moral virtues in science (Hardwig 1991), the epistemic importance of gender and race equality in science (Rolin 2002;Wray 2007a), and relations between scientific and lay communities (Grasswick 2010;Anderson 2011). In this section I discuss the role of values in collective acceptance, and in the next section I discuss the role of values in trust-based acceptance.…”
Section: Values In Collectivementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Acknowledging the importance of scientific collaboration has led many philosophers to examine its implications for the social epistemology of scientific knowledge. Some philosophers suggest that scientific knowledge emerging in collaborations involves collective beliefs or acceptances (Gilbert 2000;Bouvier 2004;Wray 2006Wray , 2007bStaley 2007;Andersen 2010;Rolin 2010;Cheon 2014). Some others suggest that the epistemic structure of scientific collaboration is based on relations of trust and interactions among scientists (Hardwig 1991;Kusch 2002;Thagard 2010;Fagan 2011Fagan , 2012Andersen and Wagenknecht 2013;de Ridder 2013;Frost-Arnold 2013;Wagenknecht 2013Wagenknecht , 2014.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Rolin (2011) argues that the debate ended in a stalemate -a judgement we share. The main reason for the stalemate, we think, is because both turned out to be right.…”
Section: The Highly Problematic Concept Of Pluralismmentioning
confidence: 90%
“…(, p. 544) argue that, despite the normative rhetoric of what should be, the ‘fragmented landscape of management (practice and scholarship)’ prevents multiple actors, with their conflicting priorities, from meaningful interaction. So, often, there is neither a shared sense of purpose (Rolin, ) nor an awareness of being part of a collective ‘regime of responsibility’ (Goodstein and Wicks, ). The divides between practitioners and scholars are clear; what is less clear is how to bridge them.…”
Section: ‘Trading Zones’ For Dialogic Encounters Between Academics Anmentioning
confidence: 99%