Diversification and Information in Contests

Lemus, Jorge; Temnyalov, Emil

doi:10.2139/ssrn.4121082

SSRN Journal

2022

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4121082

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Diversification and Information in Contests

Jorge Lemus

Emil Temnyalov

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2023

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Cited by 2 publications

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“…). 2Lemus and Temnyalov (2021) characterize the optimal disclosure of information about the technologies in Tullock contest, referring to the principal as being risk averse.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Disclosure policies in all‐pay auctions with bid caps and stochastic entry: The impact of risk aversion

Wang

Liu

2023

Bulletin of Econ Res

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We investigate how risk aversion affects the organizer's disclosing the actual number of bidders in an all‐pay auction with an exogenous bid cap and stochastic entry. With an exogenous probability of participation, the organizer prefers fully concealing the number of participating bidders when bidders are risk neutral. However, this result does not hold with risk aversion. Specifically, whether the organizer prefers fully concealing or fully revealing information depends on the number of potential bidders, the probability of participation, and the size of bid caps. A special case of endogenous entry shows that the organizer's preference is similar to the risk‐neutral case.

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“…). 2Lemus and Temnyalov (2021) characterize the optimal disclosure of information about the technologies in Tullock contest, referring to the principal as being risk averse.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Disclosure policies in all‐pay auctions with bid caps and stochastic entry: The impact of risk aversion

Wang

Liu

2023

Bulletin of Econ Res

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Optimal contest design: Tuning the heat

Letina

Liu

Netzer

2023

Journal of Economic Theory

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Diversification and Information in Contests

Cited by 2 publications

References 35 publications

Disclosure policies in all‐pay auctions with bid caps and stochastic entry: The impact of risk aversion

Disclosure policies in all‐pay auctions with bid caps and stochastic entry: The impact of risk aversion

Optimal contest design: Tuning the heat

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