2011
DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2010.12.012
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Divergent effects of different positive emotions on moral judgment

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Cited by 141 publications
(131 citation statements)
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“…Interestingly, some data dovetail with this rationale. It was shown, for instance, that specific positive emotion manipulation (e.g., mirth) increased moral utilitarianism (Strohminger, Lewis, & Meyer, 2011). The perspective of sacrificing one so as to save more people generates unpleasant feelings that generally lead to a non-utilitarian response.…”
Section: Causal Scenariomentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Interestingly, some data dovetail with this rationale. It was shown, for instance, that specific positive emotion manipulation (e.g., mirth) increased moral utilitarianism (Strohminger, Lewis, & Meyer, 2011). The perspective of sacrificing one so as to save more people generates unpleasant feelings that generally lead to a non-utilitarian response.…”
Section: Causal Scenariomentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Interestingly, previous research showed that experimentally induced positive emotions led to greater propensity for utilitarianism (Strohminger et al, 2011) although that class of moral dilemmas does not make it possible to distinguish between correct and incorrect judgments (see Bartels & Pizarro, 2011). The class of scenarios used in the present research, by contrast, leaves no doubts as to the normative standard of moral evaluation, and our data clearly showed that the occurrence of incorrect (positive) feelings in contexts of explicit moral violations leads to abnormal patterns of moral judgment.…”
Section: Beyond Emotional Callousness As a Source Of Moral Impairmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Indeed, psychologists have identified a number of emotions that seem to be specifically "moral" in nature, including guilt, shame, gratitude, and contempt (Haidt, 2003). While there has been no documentation, to our knowledge, of a corresponding suite of "modal emotions," such emotions, if they do exist, would seem to play a less significant role in modal judgment than the role played by emotion in moral judgment (Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011;Strohminger, Lewis, & Meyer, 2011). Thus, common patterns of reasoning across the two domains might help determine the proportion of variance in moral judgment that can be accounted for by seemingly nonaffective processes.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For example, tackling the question of divergent properties of discrete positive emotions directly, and showing that their differential effects resulted from differing social properties, rather than shared general Positive Affectivity, Strohminger, Lewis and Meyer (2011) demonstrated that mirth (feeling of gladness and merriment, especially when expressed by laughter) and elevation (feeling of warmth and expansion when observing another person behaving well), as two distinct positive emotions, led to distinct and differentiated moral judgments.…”
Section: Happiness Positive Affect or Discrete Positive Emotions?mentioning
confidence: 99%