Distributive justice revisited: A reconceptualization and an empirical test

Abstract

Research on distributive justice has classified allocative standards into three distinct categories: equity, need, and equality. We empirically test the notion that equality should be further divided into two distinct constructs: absolute and bounded equality, thus leading to four distinct categories of distributive justice. Using a sample of 240 individuals (119 managers and 121 union activists), we further test for differences between managers and public and private sector unionists in their endorsement of these four standards. Results support all four of our specified hypotheses. Results are discussed in terms of their implications for distributive justice issues in the workplace, and future research directions are proposed.

Making sense of egalitarian pay: Reconceptualising its treatment in organisations

“…Consistent with a reinterpretation of equality allocations as either bounded or absolute (Simpson & Varma, ), we observe that this particular approach to egalitarian pay outcomes in our sensemaking framework is bounded by referent group membership. Salient referent groups include defined work teams or groups (as much of the early research on equality allocation rules specified) or groups defined by some other common and potentially simultaneous identifier such as job or location.…”

“…Consider Cobb and Stevens () reasoned argument that larger firms are more likely to attempt to establish a sense of internal equity by engaging in wage compression among subsets of workers. Consistent with this broad range of examples, empirical support identifies equality allocations within organisations as one of absolute equality applied to all people and a standard of bounded equality applied more narrowly to salient referent others, (Simpson & Varma, ).…”

“…We suggest that for an egalitarian system to realistically function as an understood base of pay distribution, that by definition individuals require information regarding the relevant context under which egalitarian outcomes apply (Simpson & Varma, ). As we described earlier, egalitarian pay is more than simply a measure of variance, it requires by philosophical standards an intentional treatment (e.g., Rawls, ) and an explicit understanding of the relevant group to which this intentional treatment is applied (Simpson & Varma, ).…”

“…Tolbert & Zucker, ) merit pay comprises a well ensconced and accepted practice. Within public and private sector organisations, management and union members alike foremost endorse adherence to an equity allocation standard (Simpson & Varma, ); (although unionisation often does tend to push wages in the direction of greater compression). And at a societal level, proportionality of rewards is a deep‐rooted cultural norm, such as outlined in Webers classic on the protestant work ethic and capitalism ().…”

“…We suggest that for an egalitarian system to realistically function as an understood base of pay distribution, that by definition individuals require information regarding the relevant context under which egalitarian outcomes apply (Simpson & Varma, ). As we described earlier, egalitarian pay is more than simply a measure of variance, it requires by philosophical standards an intentional treatment (e.g., Rawls, ) and an explicit understanding of the relevant group to which this intentional treatment is applied (Simpson & Varma, ). We specifically suggest that any egalitarian pay practice in which recipients are blind as to the intentional amounts remunerated to others simply fails to meet the essential criteria for an egalitarian pay practice to exist, because without such information actors have no inherent basis for sensemaking from an egalitarian perspective.…”