Distributional considerations of international water resources under externality: The case of Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt on the Blue Nile

Abstract

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Weighted Bankruptcy Rules and Transboundary Water Resources Allocation

“…The Shapley value prescribes a payoff to each player that is the average marginal worth of that player to all the coalitions in which he or she can participate (Shapley 1953). This method satisfies the Core conditions, namely individual rationality, group rationality, and efficiency (Dinar and Nigatu 2013).…”

“…(Dinar et al 1992;McCarthy et al 2001;Pande and McKee 2007;Dinar and Nigatu 2013;Pande and Ertsen 2014). Some researchers argue that non-cooperative game theory solutions lead to overexploitation of the shared water resources and they are typically inefficient (Ambec and Ehlers 2008), whereas some others believe that there are some reasons for the players to prefer non-cooperation (Dinar and Nigatu 2013), for instance, high coordination cost associated with cooperation of large numbers of players (Just and Netanyahu 1998) or historical and cultural disputes among states. Recent literature on cooperative game theory distinguishes between games with transferable utility and games with non-transferable utility (Dinar et al 1992).…”

The Economics of Transboundary River Management

“…In some river basins, countries may prefer to allocate physical units of water (cf. Dinar and Nigatu, 2013), while in other basins countries may prefer to allocate the welfare derived from water use (i.e. 'benefit sharing'), although essentially there is not much difference between the two.…”

Socio-ecological systems and the distributional effect of collective conditionality constraints in rural policies: a case study in Emilia-Romagna

“…The SV and other CGT solutions have often been applied to different aspects of water resource management, such as sharing benefits from groundwater (Madani and Dinar 2012), international rivers (Dinar and Nigatu 2013), wastewater treatment plans (Loehman et al 1979) and regional water supply (Young et al 1982), including application to networks (Dong et al 2012). However, most of these studies include illustrative examples that only consider a limited number of players (typically from 3 to 5) since CGT solutions are notoriously difficult to apply to larger systems.…”