Distribution of coalitional power in randomized multi-valued social choice

Nandeibam, Shasikanta

doi:10.1007/s003550200207

Cited by 5 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…6 This is the case commonly considered, for example, in social choice contexts. Nandeibam (2003). We proceed to clarify how our NC relates to earlier, analogous, restrictions in the literature.…”

Section: Contraction Consistency and The Weak Axiom Of Stochastic Revmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…contraction consistency (NC) and the weak axiom of stochastic revealed preference (WASRP), in section 3. Our NC expands Nandeibam's (2003) notion of regularity to permit universal sets which are not-necessarily finite, whereas our WASRP expands the version in Dasgupta and Pattanaik (2007) to permit multi-valued choice. In section 3, we also clarify how our two consistency postulates subsume and unify various analogous notions available in the literature.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…2 Nandeibam (2003) has offered a probabilistic version of this condition, which he terms regularity, in the context of a finite universal set of alternatives.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The literature on collective choice has analyzed at length the implications of following various probabilistic socia y random dictatorship (e.g. Nandeibam, 2008Nandeibam, , 2003Nandeibam, , 1996Pattanaik and Peleg, 1986 …”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Within this unified framework, how should one interpret the notion of choosing consistently when the feasible set contracts? Since most choice problems in economic contexts involve universal sets that are infinite, the condition of regularity in Nandeibam (2003) needs to be suitably expanded. The first purpose of this paper is to offer such an expansion.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Contraction consistent stochastic choice correspondence

Dasgupta

2011

Soc Choice Welf

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We model a general choice environment via probabilistic choice correspondences, with (possibly) incomplete domain and infinite universal set of alternatives. We offer a consistency restriction regarding choice when the feasible set contracts. This condition, 'contraction consistency', subsumes earlier notions such as Chernoff's Condition, Sen's α and β , and regularity. We identify a restriction on the domain of the stochastic choice correspondence, under which contraction consistency is equivalent to the weak axiom of revealed preference in its most general form. When the universal set of alternatives is finite, this restriction is also necessary for such equivalence. Analogous domain restrictions are also identified for the special case where choice is deterministic but possibly multi-valued. Results due to Sen (Rev Econ Stud 38: 307-317, 1971) and Dasgupta and Pattanaik (Econ Theory 31: 35-50, 2007) fall out as corollaries. Thus, conditions are established, under which our notion of consistency, articulated only in reference to contractions of the feasible set, suffices as the axiomatic foundation for a general revealed preference theory of choice behaviour.

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Section: Contraction Consistency and The Weak Axiom Of Stochastic Revmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…2 Nandeibam (2003) has offered a probabilistic version of this condition, which he terms regularity, in the context of a finite universal set of alternatives.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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