2019
DOI: 10.1016/j.automatica.2018.12.027
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Distributed filtering under false data injection attacks

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Cited by 138 publications
(47 citation statements)
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“…[5][6][7][8][9] As we all know, cyber attacks can be mainly classified into three categories: denial of service (DoS) attacks, 10,11 deception attacks, 12,13 and replay attacks. 14 For instance, a resilient dynamic event-triggered controller was designed to cope with the DoS attacks. 15 For the deception attacks, a novel detection method (summation detector) was proposed in Reference 16.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…[5][6][7][8][9] As we all know, cyber attacks can be mainly classified into three categories: denial of service (DoS) attacks, 10,11 deception attacks, 12,13 and replay attacks. 14 For instance, a resilient dynamic event-triggered controller was designed to cope with the DoS attacks. 15 For the deception attacks, a novel detection method (summation detector) was proposed in Reference 16.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…CPSs have a wide range of applications in the fields of smart grid, intelligent transportation, aerospace, and so on. Nevertheless, due to the vulnerability of open communication networks, CPSs are easily exposed to cyber attacks including false data injection (FDI) attacks [9–12], denial of service (DoS) attacks [13–16], and so on. Many efforts have been devoted to the studies of CPSs security, e.g.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…a state estimator of wireless networked control systems with unknown input and FDI attacks has been investigated in [10]. In addition, a protection scheme for distributed filtering over the wireless sensor networks under FDI attacks has been investigated in [12]. For the DoS attack, a multi‐channel transmission framework of transmitter and attacker is established in [13], and a zero‐sum Markov random game is proposed.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…When the filtering issue is a concern, a sensor network with the same topology of LSSs usually need to be deployed to collect and process the information of subsystems. Different from traditional distributed ones applying to centralized systems [9,14,36], filtering structures emerge complex dynamical coupling due to the inherently physical coupling of LSSs. It is a pity that this kind of coupling cannot be completely removed in order to guarantee the essential filtering function, and therefore greatly limits the robustness and the scalability of developed distributed filters.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%