Distributed Blockchain-Based Authentication and Authorization Protocol for Smart Grid

Abstract

Authentication and authorization (A & A) mechanisms are critical to the security of Internet of Things (IoT) applications. Smart grid system processing and exchanging data without human intervention, known as smart grids, are well-known as IoT scenarios. Entities in such smart grid systems need to identify and validate one another and ensure the integrity of data exchange mechanisms. However, at present, most commonly used A & A protocols are centralized, resulting in security risks such as information leaks, illegal access, and identity theft. In this study, we propose a new distributed A & A protocol for smart grid networks based on blockchain technology to address with these risks. The proposed protocol integrates the decentralized authentication and immutable ledger characteristics of blockchain architectures suitable for power systems with a novel blockchain technique to realize both identity authentication and resource authorization for smart grid systems. We discuss the security of and threat models for prior A & A protocols and demonstrate how our protocol protects against these threats. We further demonstrate an approach to a real deployment of our A & A protocol using the FISCO consortium platform, applying algorithms from smart contract systems. Finally, we present the results of experimental simulations showing the efficacy and efficiency of our proposed protocol.

Blockchain-Based Identity Management System and Self-Sovereign Identity Ecosystem: A Comprehensive Survey

“…Zhong et al [166] propose an authentication and authorization protocol for a smart power grid system using a consortium blockchain. The system addresses the common security threats to the BC authentication system for smart grid networks by analyzing various threat models.…”

“…In this respect, however, every network is unique. By using user validation, a chain of trust mechanism, and building consensus protocols that imply an increased cost per identity this attack can be resisted in a blockchain [17], [19], [161], [166], [210], [212]. Many blockchains employ various consensus methods, including PoW, PoS, and DPoS, to prevent Sybil attacks [166].…”

“…By using user validation, a chain of trust mechanism, and building consensus protocols that imply an increased cost per identity this attack can be resisted in a blockchain [17], [19], [161], [166], [210], [212]. Many blockchains employ various consensus methods, including PoW, PoS, and DPoS, to prevent Sybil attacks [166]. However, these consensus methods do not prevent Sybil attacks, they only prohibit an attacker from executing the Sybil attack effectively.…”

“…Thus, an adversary cannot utilize a false identity. Zhong et al [166] propose a protocol where each entity is limited to a single public key as its identity and a single secret key linked with the public key. Furthermore, the system can validate the public key associated with a username, preventing any attacker from using a counterfeit public key and blocking Sybil attacks.…”

“…A single source or numerous sources to magnify the effect can launch such an attack [214]. Many BC-based IDMS studies [9], [10], [16], [17], [20], [151], [166] have suggested various mechanisms to resist this attack against the blockchain-enabled system for identity management. In [20], the authors restrict the block size where most of the group signature checks for the transaction input.…”