2020
DOI: 10.1111/acfi.12718
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Distracted institutional investors and audit risk

Abstract: Using a newly developed institutional investor distraction measure, we examine whether auditors increase their risk assessment when clients’ institutional investors temporarily reduce their monitoring activities. We find that audit fees and audit report lags increase during periods when institutional investors temporarily focus their attention on other parts of their portfolio. This effect is stronger when dedicated institutional investors are distracted. We further show that the identified relationship is wea… Show more

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Cited by 10 publications
(6 citation statements)
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References 65 publications
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“…As far as debt (DEBT) is concerned, the absence of any association for SMEs may stem from less pressure on the part of creditors to speed up the presentation of the financial statements [32]. Those studies which identified a positive association highlighted the impact on ARL in the case of high debt levels [74] or a large number of debtors [26]; thus, less debt and/or fewer creditors in the case of SMEs may justify this result.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As far as debt (DEBT) is concerned, the absence of any association for SMEs may stem from less pressure on the part of creditors to speed up the presentation of the financial statements [32]. Those studies which identified a positive association highlighted the impact on ARL in the case of high debt levels [74] or a large number of debtors [26]; thus, less debt and/or fewer creditors in the case of SMEs may justify this result.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Consistent with the decrease in corporate governance by distracted institutional investors, Yang et al (2020) find that auditors allocate more effort, proxied in their study by audit fee and audit report lags, to firms with distracted institutional investors due to the increased audit risk.…”
Section: Institutional Investors' Attentionmentioning
confidence: 52%
“…Accordingly, Liu et al (2020) find that ineffective independent directors are less likely to receive unsupportive votes in proxy voting from institutional investors when these investors are temporally distracted. Also, Yang et al (2020) find that firms' audit risk increases when firms' institutional investors are distracted.…”
Section: Chapter 1 Introductionmentioning
confidence: 93%
“…We also include debt security as control as it is related to the level of agency problem in a company (Park, 2000). Additionally, we include two variables related to institutional investors' shareholdings to isolate the effect of Distract on Bank_debt (Yang et al. , 2020).…”
Section: Data and Research Designmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We also include debt security as control as it is related to the level of agency problem in a company (Park, 2000). Additionally, we include two variables related to institutional investors' shareholdings to isolate the effect of Distract on Bank_debt (Yang et al, 2020). We include the fraction of shares held by institutional investors (Instown) and institutional shareholders concentration (Instcon).…”
Section: The Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%