Distinguishing regeneration from degradation in coral ecosystems: the role of value

Abstract

In this paper I argue that the value attributed to coral reefs drives the characterisation of evidence for their regeneration or degradation. I observe that regeneration and degradation depend on an understanding of what an ecosystem looks like when undegraded (a baseline), and that many mutually exclusive baselines can be given for any single case. Consequently, facts about ecological processes are insufficient to usefully and non-arbitrarily characterise changes to ecosystems. By examining how baselines and the value of reefs interact in coral and algal reef examples, I argue that considering the value of an ecosystem is a necessity when describing processes like regeneration and degradation. This connects value as studied in socio-ecological and economic research with values as discussed in the philosophy of science literature. It also explains why such a broad range of processes may be considered regenerative, including those which introduce significant novelty, as well as pointing towards ways to mediate related debates, such as those surrounding novel and ‘pristine’ ecosystems.

Exploring the socio-ecology of science: the case of coral reefs

“…One answer is that they instantiate epistemic values, that is, ideals, virtues, heuristics, or goals which are directly conducive to the production of knowledge, such as accuracy, internal consistency, simplicity 3 , and generality (de Regt, 2020;Longino, 1994Longino, , 1996Longino, , 2008. But non-epistemic values, those which go beyond knowledge production, such as ethical, aesthetic and pragmatic considerations, may also influence science, and arguments have been made both for their costs and their benefits (Vellend, 2019;Hicks, 2014;Elliott & McKaughan, 2014;Jones, 2021).…”

“…So too may they idealise aspects of nature to help perpetuate certain socio-ecological conditions, such as contributing to the flourishing of various types of living system. Ecological baselines, an important area of contention in coral science, are the quintessential example of this socio-ecologicallyoriented idealisation (Jones, 2021). The interplay of science and wellbeing make for deep connections between ethics and epistemology here, and offer situated examples of non-epistemic values being constitutive of scientific practice (Hicks, 2014;Longino, 1996).…”

Justifying nature-based solutions

“…A desert, for example, might be considered a blue/green area, despite being yellow. 4 For a small sample of recent philosophical discussion on conservation, and in particular, what ought to be conserved, see Jones 2021;Casetta 2020;Santana 2019;Marris 2013;Cole and Yung 2010. Before continuing, it will be useful to distinguish between two broad NbS strategies. The first strategy I will call "conservation-focused," which includes managing wetlands, restoring drylands, conserving forests, etc.…”

How to Be a Naturalist and a Social Constructivist about Diseases

“…We believe expanding our notion of the moral community in this way produces a coherent and compelling sense in which the social constructivist definition of disease we have outlined applies naturally and equally to nonhuman animals. And while the details remain to be worked out, we believe that recent advances in ecological thinking provide a robustly normative sense of the interests of nonanimal biological individuals that will allow plant diseases to be similarly integrated into our account in time (see, for example, McShane 2004, 233-36;Griffiths 2021;Jones 2021).…”