Distinguishing Natural Selection from Other Evolutionary Processes in the Evolution of Altruism

Abstract

Altruism is one of the most studied topics in theoretical evolutionary biology. The debate surrounding the evolution of altruism has generally focused on the conditions under which altruism can evolve and whether it is better explained by kin selection or multilevel selection. This debate has occupied the forefront of the stage and left behind a number of equally important questions. One of them, which is the subject of this article, is whether the word ''selection'' in ''kin selection'' and ''multilevel selection'' necessarily refers to ''evolution by natural selection.'' I show, using a simple individual-centered model, that once clear conditions for natural selection and altruism are specified, one can distinguish two kinds of evolution of altruism, only one of which corresponds to the evolution of altruism by natural selection, the other resulting from other evolutionary processes.

A Chemostat Model for Evolution by Persistence: Clade Selection and Its Explanatory Autonomy

“…1 We in contrast see reproduction and persistence as two sides of the same explanatory coin: The former has to do with how lower-level entities—cells or species in the example here—come to be replaced , but the latter has to do with how long the clones or clades derived from them last. While the connection between persistence and reproduction has been noticed before, our model aims to clarify and legitimize the nature of this connection (Bourrat 2015c; Papale 2020).…”

Taming fitness: Organism‐environment interdependencies preclude long‐term fitness forecasting

“…This point, with a few exceptions, [63,69,85] has too often been missed in the philosophical literature. It can also be made from an individual organismic perspective.…”

Supernatural Beliefs and the Evolution of Cooperation

“…By cooperation, we mean here any social behavior that can be exploited by another individual (i.e., is subject to free-riding or cheating). Classically, if a cooperator pays a cost c to contribute to the production of a good b shared by the members of a community (often including the focal individual), it becomes tempting and evolutionarily advantageous to receive b without having to pay c (Bourrat, 2015d). It is thus expected that in a single community, whenever a situation of that sort arises, cheaters or "freeriders" will invade the population, which often results in overexploiting the resources and leads to a tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968).…”