Distinctions, Differentiations, Ontology, and Non-humans in Theories of Religion

Abstract

This essay has four main parts. (1) Reviewing previous theories of religion, it suggests that it may be helpful not to conflate, a priori, the notions of (the) religious on the one hand and religion\s on the other, and that it may be useful to explore concepts such as (the) sacred and transcendence as independent yet related to the business of theorizing religion. (2) Distinguishing social/cultural from biological/genetic evolution, it outlines the occurrence of three processes/stages of the evolution of religious affairs and religions(s), here called attributive, structural, and functional differentiation respectively. While the first two processes/stages occurred in the remote and ancient past respectively, the third process/stage is typical of modernities and has by now globalized. (3) The article argues that recent criticisms of the validity of the category of religion are informed by a reverse sui generis approach characterized by a tacit claim that religion is an anomaly, by virtue of its supposedly being inherently different from similar concepts. The article suggests that John Searle's philosophy may throw light on the mode of existence (ontology) of religion as an example of social and institutional reality, as an intentionality-and observerrelative yet real and empowering structure. (4) In the final section, the article engages some lines of thinking of Bruno Latour's interpretation of Actor-Network-Theory, in particular the category of non-humans and the importance of things (objects) for social reality, including religion.

‘Religion,’ ‘the Secular’ and the Critical Study of Religion

“…Furthermore, all concepts … that operate on a similar level of abstraction are to a greater or lesser extent ‘contaminated’ by their entanglement in political and other social processes. Religion is not different in this respect’ (Stausberg, 2010: 364–365).…”

Debating Shirk in Keralam, South India: Monotheism between Tradition, Text and Performance

“…But the detour into a parallel Abrahamic texttradition binary and Awad's assessment of it pushes recognition that both sides are actually drawing upon complex configurations, which themselves pull in a combination of appeals: to scripture, to tradition, to contemporary practice, to pragmatic and aesthetic-affectual considerations and to the mysteriousness or the clarity of God's instructions and communications. Assemblages of various human and non-human factors come together temporarily into moments of debate or encounter or decision, to produce positions which then become ossified into objects with power and afterlife, named 'Mujahid' or 'Sunni', and shorthanded as associated with 'text' or 'tradition' (Stausberg, 2010). As Awad argues for the Christian case, the gulf between Muslim sects is more apparent than real.…”

Theory-building: working the theory-data spectrum

“…In the 1960s through 1980s, primarily, scholars of religion/s attempted to get around this counter-claim by focusing on the concept of 'religion': they proposed two inter-related criteria that serve to demarcate the study of religion/s as a separate discipline: sui generis or religionist views of religion; and a distinctive method, broadly "phenomenological," for studying religion seen in this way (SEGAL, 2006, p. xiii-xvii;see ENGLER;STAUSBERG, 2011, p. 129-30). This approach has largely been abandoned due to (i) critiques of religionist views of religion (e.g., WIEBE, 1984;MCCUTCHEON, 1997;FITZGERALD, 2000;NONGBRI, 2013) and (ii) the facts that the alleged method is neither unitary nor unique to the study of religion/s, as well as being problematic for various reasons (HANEGRAAFF, 1995;STAUSBERG; ENGLER, 2011; FUJIWARA, THURFJEL; ENGLER, forthcoming). Nor can scholars of religion claim to have unique theoretical approaches: we are far more likely to appropriate theories from other disciplines than to generate theories specific to our discipline (STAUSBERG;ENGLER, 2016).…”

“…This approach has largely been abandoned due to (i) critiques of religionist views of religion (e.g., WIEBE, 1984;MCCUTCHEON, 1997;FITZGERALD, 2000;NONGBRI, 2013) and (ii) the facts that the alleged method is neither unitary nor unique to the study of religion/s, as well as being problematic for various reasons (HANEGRAAFF, 1995;STAUSBERG; ENGLER, 2011; FUJIWARA, THURFJEL; ENGLER, forthcoming). Nor can scholars of religion claim to have unique theoretical approaches: we are far more likely to appropriate theories from other disciplines than to generate theories specific to our discipline (STAUSBERG;ENGLER, 2016). In sum, it is simply not the case that the study of religion/s is unique in terms of its subject matter, its method(s), or its theoretical approaches.…”